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I. PHANTOM REGULATION
The Supreme Court fundamentally altered executive branch power
and leverage to make law in America. In its 5-4 decision in Michigan v.
Environmental Protection Agency,1 and for the first time, the Supreme Court
mandated consideration of economic cost as the new fulcrum for exercise of
executive branch law-making power.2 Amid daily palpable friction between
the executive and legislative branches of government in the United States,3
1

Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S.Ct. 2699 (2015).
The federalist form of government, in which there is substantial separate power at the state or
provincial levels in addition to at the federal level, include the United States (50 states, 2
commonwealths, and 12 territories primarily in the Pacific Ocean), Canada (10 provinces and 2
territories), Mexico (31 states), Brazil (26 states), Germany (16 states), Switzerland (26 cantons)
Argentina (23 provinces), Australia (6 states and 2 territories), and India (29 states and 7 territories). This list includes the most significant and economically successful non-Communist countries
on 5 continents, North America, Central America, South America, Europe, and Australia, as well
as India in Asia. This form of government, while only shared in a small number of countries, has
been employed in successful countries. See List of Countries By System of Government, http://cs.mc
gill.ca/~rwest/wikispeedia/wpcd/wp/l/List_of_countries_by_system_of_government.htm (summarizing countries that employ federalism as a form of government); see also Federalism, https://en
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federalism (providing background on federalism as a system of government).
3
Michele Richinick & Joy Y. Yang, Obama Sharply Crticizes Congress in White House Address,
MSNBC (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/obama-sharply-criticizes-congress-wh
2
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previously untouchable conventional Chevron deference4 to executive branch
power was altered. This article legally navigates through each aspect of this
change: It analyzes current and future implications. of, and arising controversies with, the new Supreme Court economic requirement on the exercise
of executive power in American government.
The Obama administration utilized executive branch action and
regulations to create new law without needing to involve the legislature;5 the
Trump administration is using unilateral executive orders, without involving
the Congress, to attempt to dismember parts of the regulated state.6 This new
Supreme Court decision changes legal requirements for executive actions
applied in either direction. Friction between U.S. branches of government was
a common denominator7 before the jobs of coal miners were a central topic in
the most recent presidential election,8 with this administrative conflict already
in motion in the courts.
The Obama Administration Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
promulgated its Mercury and Air Toxics Standard (“MATS”) rule to reign in
coal use and climate-changing emissions.9 The rule imposed approximately
$9.6 billion in costs annually on the U.S. economy as the means to realize direct
public hazardous pollutant benefits of $4 to 5 million annually.10 The costs of
complying with this regulation were approximately 2,000 times greater than its
estimated direct benefits of reducing hazardous coal-power plants’ air
pollution, without adding indirect “co-benefits.”11
ite-house-address#52721 (providing instance of tension between government branches during
Obama presidency); Robert Draper, Trump vs. Congress: Now What? N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE,
(Mar. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/26/magazine/trump-vs-congress-now-what.
html (providing instance of tension between government branches during Trump presidency).
4
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
5
See Steven Ferrey, Presidential Executive Action: Unilaterally Changing the World’s
Critical Technology and Infrastructure, 64 DRAKE L.R. 43 (2016) (Providing instance of
executive branch creating law without legislature under Obama).
6
Jacqueline Alemany, Trump Signs Executive Order Dismantling Obama Environmental
Regulations, CBS NEWS (March 28, 2017), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-signs-exec
utive-order-dismantling-obama-environmental-regulations/ (Providing instance of Trump Administration using unilateral executive orders); Dan Boyce, Trump Targets EPA And Obama
Climate Change Regulations, INSIDE ENERGY, http://insideenergy.org/2017/03/29/trump-targetsepa-and-obama-climate-change-regulations/ (suspending the Clean Power Plan of the EPA).
7
Alemany, supra note 6.
8
Clifford Krauss & Michael Corkery, A Bleak Outlook for Trump’s Promises to Coal Miners,
N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 19), 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/business/energy-environ
ment/a-bleak-outlook-for-trumps-promises-to-coal-miners.html.
9
Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2705-06 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 9326).
10
Id.
11
The controversy concerning co-benefits is discussed in detail, infra., at Section V.
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When states challenged when the executive agency initially failed to
consider these costs which the regulation imposed on the U.S. economy, the
Supreme Court ruled this unilateral executive action to be illegal.12 The Court
created and imposed a new de novo “cost” consideration on the exercise of
certain executive powers, even though the legislature did not expressly require
any consideration of cost for this rule.13 Cost now exists as a phantom presence
stalking future executive branch regulation, created sue sponte by the Court
without statutory command. This Supreme Court decision in Michigan v. EPA
shifts power between the Constitution’s Article I legislative branch and the
Article II executive branch of American government. This article analyzes in
detail the layers of legal complexities and examines still unresolved uncertainties of this new rule of administrative and constitutional law.
Section II examines sequentially all relevant executive orders on cost
and economics issued as part of the prior five presidential administrations.
Section II sets the legal stage, focusing particularly on cost consideration by
the executive branch when promulgating environmental regulations and
climate change rules. This flows into the key recent Supreme Court decision
imposing a new legal requirement on Obama Administration executive branch
regulation of carbon-emitting coal in the U.S. power sector.14
When this rule was challenged in Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court,
sue sponte, imposed a never-before-manifest cost restraint on the exercise of
executive branch power.15 Section III analyzes this Supreme Court decision
restraining executive power. Building the law on technology, Section III first
examines the technology of coal in the U.S. economy. On this foundation,
Section III goes on to analyze the Obama Administration MATS rule, parses
the legal basis of the five-justice majority opinion, reflects critically on key
elements of the four-justice dissent, and traces the original contours of the
dissent by Judge Kavanaugh as well as the opinion of the majority of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals that was reversed by the Court.
Section IV examines every operand16 of this newly imposed cost
algorithm for American law. In Michigan v. EPA,17 costs outweighed direct
benefits by approximately 2000:1. Substituting the agency’s choice of operand
12

See Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2699 (confirming that unilateral executive action is illegal).
See id. at 2711 (showing that the U.S. Supreme Court established a de novo cost consideration).
14
See infra, Section II.
15
See Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2699 (indicating that the Supreme Court imposed a cost
restraint on executive branch power).
16
Meriam-Webster defines an “operand” as “something (such as a quantity or data) that is operated on (as in a mathematical operation).” MERIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/operand (last visited Nov. 28, 2017).
17
See Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2706 (providing instance when costs majorly outweighed benefits).
13
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to add indirect co-benefits, reversed the regulatory economics to make indirect
benefits exceed costs.18 Critics alleged that agencies will double-count so-called
‘co-benefits’ to transform a directly not cost-beneficial executive regulation to
be indirectly beneficial.19 Section IV dissects absolute costs, derivative costs,
and disputed costs as elements of a cost analysis. Section IV takes the next step
from the Michigan case of first impression, to examine whether executive
branch agencies can employ their own algorithm on costs and benefits to steer
the economic outcome of the newly required cost consideration.
Section V exumes the “cost” phantom now lurking in administrative
law. Section V examines the legal positions now asserted by the reversed federal agency, state Attorneys General, and private sector stakeholders on what
is or is not an acceptable math algorithm regarding alleged ‘double-counting’
of co-benefits. The Michigan Supreme Court decision leaves the choice of the
cost algorithm initially to the agency;20 once selected and applied, the algorithm will be challenged whenever the imposed costs are billions of dollars
annually, as they were in the Michigan case.21
Section VI navigates thorugh the Administrative Procedure Act22 as
interpreted by the Court, now reshaping conventional Chevron deference as the
decision rule for the executive branch.23 Chevron is legally foundational: it is
the most cited administrative law precedent by the Supreme Court year after
year24 and one of the twenty most-cited Supreme Court cases in the history of
the Court.25 The Michigan Court changed Chevron deference. As analyzed in
the next sections, the legal contours and constraints of administrative law are
altered and still evolving.

18

See infra. Section IV.
See infra. Section IV.
20
Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2711.
21
Id. at 2706.
22
5 U.S.C. 551, et seq.
23
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
24
Chris Walker, Most Cited Supreme Court Administrative Law Decisions, YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Oct. 9, 2014).
25
See Most-Cited U.S. Supreme Court Cases in Hein Online Part II, HEIN ONLINE BLOG,
http://heinonline.blogspot.com/2009/01/most-cited-us-supreme-court-cases-in.html (supporting
proposition that Chevron is frequently cited).
19
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II. PRECIPITATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT
A. Constitutional Federalism Separating Branch I and Branch II
Federalism principles in the U.S. Constitution of checks and balances
between executive and legislative branches separate the power of the branches
of government. The U.S. Constitution Art. 1, § 8, gave Congress the power to
make laws “necessary and proper” for carrying all other powers vested in
Congress by the U.S. Constitution.26 “Necessary and proper” is a broad
umbrella, which ultimately the Supreme Court must interpret.27 This works on
two levels: (1) The federal government has authority to enact necessary and
proper laws, and (2) once federal laws are enacted, administering federal agencies must stay within their grants of authority under specific laws. In recent
confrontations, there has been particular focus on regulatory authority under
the 1970 Clean Air Act.28
And at this point in time, much of the focus is on climate change and
global warming. Global energy-related emissions of carbon are expected to
increase 57% from 2005 to 2030.29 At current rates of energy development
worldwide, energy-related CO2 emissions in 2050 would be 150% of their
current levels under business-as-usual development, primarily due to increased
energy use.30 This Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) forecast is shown in Figure 1.31 The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) in 2014 concluded that in order to maintain world
warming below 2° Celsius (C), there must be a 40-70% reduction of GHG
emissions from 2010 levels by 2050.32
26

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (explaining that Chief Justice Marshall found
that “necessary and proper” is broad enough to allow Congress to establish a bank to aid in
carrying out the taxing and borrowing powers vested in the Congress under Article 1, § 8).
28
See infra. Section III.
29
U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-151, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE
PROGRAMS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME
AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL’S CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM (Nov. 2008), http://www.
gao.gov/assets/290/283397.pdf
30
Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. (OECD), Environmental Outlook to 2050: Key Findings
on Climate Change, http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/Outlook%20to%202050_Climate%20Ch
ange%20Chapter_HIGLIGHTS-FINA-8pager-UPDATED%20NOV2012.pdf.
31
Id.
32
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2014 Synthesis
Report Summary for Policymakers, https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5
_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf.
27
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Figure 133

In 2013, without involving the Congress and using executive branch
regulations, President Obama announced his “Climate Action Plan,” and directed EPA to work expeditiously to promulgate CO2 emission standards for fossil
fuel-fired power plants.34 EPA estimated the benefits of its four Clean Air Act
unilateral executive branch regulations would accrue a combined annual economic value of approximately $500 billion, and $2 trillion in 2020:35
•

33

The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, promulgated in July 2011,
requires that 27 eastern states reduce the amount of emissions
from cross-border power plants.36 EPA estimates that this rule
accrues economic benefits of $120 t0 $280 billion annually.37

OECD, supra note 30 (“ROW” refers to “rest of the world”).
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (June 2013), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf.
35
Nicholas Z. Muller & Robert Mendelson, Efficient Pollution Regulations: Getting the
Prices Right, 99 AM. ECONOMIC REV. 1714 (2009).
36
See Overview of the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (2011). https://
www.epa.gov/csapr/overview-cross-state-air-pollution-rule-csapr (describing EPA rule on cross
state air pollution).
37
Cross State Air Pollution Rule: Reducing Air Pollution Protecting Public Health, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/csaprpresentation.pdf.
34
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•

The Mercury and Air Toxics (MATs) rule, promulgated in
December 2011, regulates mercury and other hazardous air
pollution emitted from both new and old power plants, to
deliver between $37 and $90 billion of benefits annually.38

•

The Industrial Boiler Rule, promulgated in April 2012, lowers
the amount of air pollution that is released from commercial,
industrial and institutional boilers to generate between $27 and
$67 billion annually in health benefits.39

•

The Cement Kiln Rule, promulgated in August 2010, reduces
mercury and other air pollutants from cement plants across the
country to generate an estimated $7-$19 billion annually in
benefits.40

EPA estimates the economic benefits of the four rules based in saved
lives, averted emergency and hospital visits, prevented non-fatal heart attacks,
and cost savings from missed work and school days.41 In essence, the reductions in chronic health conditions constitute the overwhelming share of the cost
savings attributed to air pollution prevention, where health care accounts for a
significant portion of all levels of governments’ budgets.42 EPA concluded that
more than 160,000 lives were saved in 2010 because of the reductions in ozone
and particulate matter following the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments which
38

Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/mats.
Vol. 78, No. 21 FEDERAL REGISTER 7139 (Jan. 31, 2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pk
g/FR-2013-01-31/pdf/2012-31646.pdf.
40
Final Amendments to National Air Toxics Emission Standards and New Source Performance
Standards for Portland Cement Manufacturing, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
sites/production/files/2016-04/documents/080910_neshap_factsheet.pdf.
41
James Bradbury, Bills That Would Limit the U.S. EPA's Clean Air Act Authorities, WORLD
RES. INST. (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.wri.org/stories/2011/04/bills-would-limit-us-epasclean-air-act-authorities; FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 59-61 (2004).
42
ELIZABETH MORSS & DAVID R. WOOLEY, THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 4 (26th ed.
2016) (providing that this includes the Medicaid and Medicare programs, where Medicare
incurs upwards of 45% of the medical bills of treating and managing air pollution induced
diseases while Medicaid [split between federal and states government funds] covers over
20% of these costs); see also Britt Groosman et al., The Ancillary Benefits from Climate
Policy in the United States, 50 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 585 (providing that while some
scholars argue that co-pollutant concerns should not inform climate policy, there is strong
correlation between GHGs and traditionally regulated pollutants under the Clean Air Act).
39
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were estimated to deliver economic benefits of approximately “$2 trillion in
2020.”43 EPA conducted a Secondary Prospective Analysis in 2011 which
showed an incremental increase in direct annual costs of air pollution control
of approximately $70 per capita in 2000, $170 per capita in 2010, and $190 per
capita in 2020.44
“Benefits” associated with environmental rules represent quantified
estimated health impacts. “In 2012, OMB reported estimated annual benefits
from major federal regulations totaling $141 billion to $691 billion and
estimated annual costs of $42.4 billion to $66.3 billion for fiscal years 2001
through 2011, with EPA regulations accounting for 60 to 82 percent of the
benefits and 43 to 53 percent of the costs.”45 All of these initiatives thrust the
use of coal-fired power into the spotlight.
Regarding regulation under the Clean Air Act, there is a specified
division of state and federal authority where states have the “first-implementer
role,”46 while EPA “is relegated . . . to a secondary role.”47 However, within this
Clean Air Act envelope, there is no federal case law, nor any Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), Department of Energy (DOE), or Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rules, which have, or can, resolve direct
conflicts between counting environmental ‘benefits’ against the cost imposed on
the operation of power generation units to reduce polluting operation.48
43

Teresa B. Clemmer, Staving off the Climate Crisis: The Sectoral Approach under the Clean
Air Act, 40 ENVTL. L. 1125, 1138 (2010).
44
Envtl. Prot. Agency, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, Final Report – Rev. A
at 3-7 (indicating that a large proportion of these costs are associated with direct capital
investments in technology and other applications).
45
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-14-519, EPA Should Improve Adherence to Guidance
for Selected Elements of Regulatory Impact Analyses, Report to Congressional Requesters
(July 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664872.pdf; see also Office of Management and
Budget, Regulatory Analysis: Circular A–4 to the Heads of Executive Agencies and
Establishments, 68 Fed. Reg. 58366 (2003), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/cir
culars_a004_a-4/ (describing the benefit side of cost-benefit analyses); Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Executive Summary, Cost-Benefit Analysis and
the Environment, at 19 (2006) (“Any project or policy that destroys or depreciates an
environmental asset needs to include in its costs the [total economic value, or TEV] of the
lost asset. Similarly, in any project or policy that enhances an environmental asset, the change
in the TEV of the asset needs to be counted as a benefit. For instance, ecosystems produce
many services and hence the TEV of any ecosystem tends to be equal to the discounted value
of those services.”).
46
EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Train
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975)) (emphasis omitted).
47
Train, 421 U.S. at 79.
48
Steven Ferrey, “Broken at Both Ends the Need to Reconnect Energy and Environment,”
65 SYRACUSE L.R. 1044, 97 (2015).
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Efforts of the Obama administration to regulate the environment and
climate focused on the power sector, with ‘cost’ emerging as a new legal factor
in three key matters:
•

The attempt to restrict power plant hazardous mercury emissions, which was overturned and remanded by the Supreme
Court in Michigan v. EPA49

•

The attempt to regulate interstate migration of criteria air pollutants, eventually upheld by the Supreme Court in EME Homer50

• The attempt to restrict CO2 global warming emissions, focusing
on coal-fired power plants, which was preliminarily enjoined
indefinitely by the Supreme Court in West Virginia.51
And ‘cost’ is the primary area where the Supreme Court has altered the
separation of power and the line between executive and legislative branch
discretion. Of note, Judge Kavanaugh, before he was nominated to be a member of the Supreme Court, was a member of the D.C. Circuit panel which
rendered the first two of these three opinions. The Supreme Court upheld his
dissent in Michigan, and partially overturned the majority opinion he joined
in EME Homer.52
B. Cost-Benefit and EPA Regulation–the Context
The Supreme Court discovery of costs, has some history. The U.S.
Flood Control Act of 1936 mandated the evaluation of proposed projects to
ascertain that the overall benefits outweigh the cost of the project.53 Since then,
consideration of cost became part of the regulatory process, performing analysis of cost and inflationary impacts during the terms of Presidents Nixon and
Ford.54 The federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in its role
49

Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2711.
EME Homer City Generation L.P., 696 F.3d at 31, rev’d. by E.P.A. v. EME Homer City
Generation, L.P., 134 S.Ct. 1584 (2014).
51
Order in Pending Case, West Virginia v. EPA, 577 U.S. (February 9, 2016) (No. 157A773)
(indefinite stay by Court).
52
Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2711; EME Homer City Generation L.P., 696 F.3d at 32.
53
EUSTON QUAH & RAYMOND TOH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CASES AND MATERIALS 6
(2012).
54
Carolene Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost Analysis, 22
GEO. MASON. L. REV. 575, 580 (2015).
50
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overseeing regulatory initiatives of all other government agencies, developed
guidelines on researching regulatory options that produce maximized net
benefits.55 OMB, following executive orders, has instructed agencies to conduct
benefit-cost analysis to improve transparency in the regulatory process unless
the same is prohibited by law, such as under the Clean Air Act National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) that implicity prohibits benefit-cost analysis.56
During President Carter’s term, the agencies were required to perform
cost-effectiveness studies, and during the term of President Reagan, cost-benefit
analysis became a mandatory step in the regulatory process.57 President Reagan
issued executive order 12291 requiring government agencies to perform
Regulatory Impact Analysis (i.e. benefit-cost analysis) to reduce the burden of
existing and future regulatory rules and require net benefits to the public.58 In
practice, the EPA has performed a comparative pros-cons test of every ‘major
rule’ (including almost all the NAAQS rules) since the Nixon Administration,
which coincided with the most substantive Clean Air Act amendments.59
Federal agencies, including the EPA, are required under Executive
Order 12866, issued by President Clinton, to perform cost analysis when their
actions are going to cause an economic impact on a scale of more than $100
million per year, unless it is explicitly ordered otherwise by applicable statutes.60 While determining what benefits are available, an agency is not
restrained to consider only quantifiable benefits which can be measured in
55

U.S. OMB, Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations under Executive Order 12866
(Washington, D.C., January 1996).
56
42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409(b)(1).
57
Cecot, supra note 54, at 581.
58
46 Fed. Reg 13193.
59
See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and
the Value of Nothing 58 (2004) at 59-61 (Outlining “richer is safer” studies and other cost-benefit
analyses); Matthew D. Adler & Erik A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.
J. 165, 173-74 (1999) (highlighting cost-benefit analysis for agricultural pesticides).
60
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Acts of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (codified
at 2 U.S.C. § 32) (UMRA); Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (requiring agencies to
perform cost study of rules impacting the economy. UMRA requires agencies to choose options
which either reduces the cost due to the program or is the least burdensome to implement unless
the agency can explain why the particular option should not be accepted; Executive Order 12866
guides agencies that while promulgating regulations benefitting the public by improving public
health or the environment from the failure of private sector’s initiatives on their own, agencies
assess “all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives”; Also “Federal agencies should
promulgate only such regulations as are required by law, are necessary to interpret the law, or are
made necessary by compelling public need, such as material failures of private markets to protect
or improve the health and safety of the public, the environment, or the well-being of the American
people. In deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and benefits of
available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating.”).
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monetary units, but also allowed to consider qualitative benefits.61 While all
the prior Executive Orders of prior Presidents remain in effect, President
Obama issued Executive Order 13563 reaffirming that benefit-cost analysis is
a mandatory part of the regulatory rulemaking process.62
The era of modern environmental laws did not begin until 1970, with
most federal environmental laws enacted between 1970 – 1980.63 See Table 1.
Table 1: Major U.S. Environmental Laws
Name of Statute
National Environmental Policy Act
Clean Air Act
Clean Water Act
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act
Ocean Dumping Act
Endangered Species Act
Safe Drinking Water
Toxic Substances Control Act
Resources Conservation and
Recovery Act
Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and
Liability Act
Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act

Known As
NEPA
CAA
CWR
FIFRA

Year Passed
1970
1970
1972
1972

ESA
SDWR
TSCA
RCRA

1972
1973
1974
1976
1976

Superfund or
CERCLA

1980

EPCRA

1980

Since the early days of Clean Air Act amendments in 1970, EPA has
incorporated cost as a factor in its rulemaking process, either as a cost of the
technology to achieve the standards, or as cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit
analysis based on the above executive orders. There were at least seventy-four
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) studies at EPA that factored cost either as part
of a cost-effectiveness analysis or cost-benefit analysis to select between various
options and technologies presented during the administrations of Presidents
61

Id. (“Costs and benefits shall be understood to include both quantifiable measures (to the
fullest extent that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and
benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider.”).
62
Cecot, supra note 54, at 582; 76 FR 3821..
63
STEVEN FERREY, Environmental Law: Examples & Explanations, 40 (7th ed. 2016).
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Reagan, H.W. Bush, and Clinton.64 By contrast, in Michigan v. EPA, EPA
claimed cost did not play any role during EPA’s MATS rulemaking, until the
Supreme Court overruled the agency.65
In addition to the generic executive orders that consider costs, some
statutes mandate that EPA perform benefit-cost analysis as part of promul-gation
of a regulation. And to the extent that the EPA follows or fails to follow this
statutory mandate, courts are the arbiters. In Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, EPA was challenged because EPA did not take economic cost into
account while establishing standards of performance for Portland cement
plants.66 The EPA was then regulating the cement plants under Clean Air Act
section 111(b)(1)(A) after the cement plants were designated as the stationary
source of pollution contributing to the “endangerment of public health and
welfare or [safety].” 67 In the Clean Air Act section 111(a), “standards of performance” are defined as a standard set by the administrator for the emission of an
air pollutant given the best available technology and cost for attainment.68 The
64

Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government Do BenefitCost Analysis?, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 192, 192-211 (2007).
65
See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791 (1998) (holding that EPA reasonably
interpreted statute outlining various facets of nitrogen oxide emission limits); see also Arteva
Specialties S.a.r.l. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088 (2003) (explaining EPA considered cost while
performing cost-effectiveness analysis for NESHAPs under Clean Air Act section
112(d)(2)); Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S.
547 (2001) (providing that promulgating rules under Clean Air Act section 109, National
Ambient Air Quality Standards, EPA is not required to consider cost-benefit analysis because
unambiguous language of Act section 109 charges EPA to promulgate rule for public safety
and does not required EPA to consider cost); American Lung Assn. v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388
(1998) (holding EPA did not adequately explain its conclusion that physical effects
experienced by some asthmatics from exposure to short-term, high-level SO2 bursts did not
amount to public health problem).
66
Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 379 (1973).
67
Id. at 378.
68
42 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (“The term ‘standard of performance’ means a standard for
emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable
through the application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account
the cost of achieving such reduction and any non-air quality health and environmental impact
and energy requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.”). The EPA Administrator in the Background Document required under NEPA,
recorded the findings of total economic cost to the cement industry as a result of promulgation of rules regulating cement plants and relied on this findings during the rulemaking
process. See Portland, 486 F.2d at 387 (citation omitted) (“The Administrator found in the
Background Document that, for a new wet-process plant with a capacity of 2.5 million
barrels per year, the total investment for all installed air pollution control equipment will
represent approximately 12 percent of the investment for the total facility. He also found that
‘[a]nnual operating costs for the control equipment will be approximately 7 percent of the
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petitioners were not satisfied with the cost study done during the rulemaking
process, and demanded a more quantified cost-benefit analysis. But, the court
did not find the quantified benefit-cost analysis as a necessary requirement.69
This resulting deference underwent a tectonic shift in the Supreme
Court.
III. THE SUPREME COURT SUA SPONTE INJECTS ECONOMICS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: MICHIGAN V. EPA
In Michigan v. EPA,70 the Supreme Court had to interpret what needed
to be part of the unilateral administrative process when promulgating the scope
of an “appropriate and necessary” standard for regulation of certain traditional
steam-cycle power generators, Electric Utility Steam Generating Units (EGUs),
delegated by the Congress to the Environmental Protection Agency under the
Clean Air Act.71
A. Coal, Mercury, Health
The Congressional Research Service noted that “[c]oal is an inherently
‘dirty’ fuel” that emits “sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), particulates, mercury, acid gases, and other pollutants, in greater abundance than
other fossil fuels.”72 When burned to produce electricity, coal is the most
pollutant-emitting fossil fuel.73 Coal releases approximately 29% more carbon
per unit of energy produced than does oil, and 80% more carbon per energy
total plant operating costs if a baghouse is used for the kiln, and 5 percent if an electrostatic
precipitator is used.’”).
69
Id. (“Such studies should be considered by the Administrator, if adduced in comments, but
we do not inject them as a necessary condition of action.”); see also Essex Chemical Corp.
v. Ruckelhaus, 486 F.2d 427, 437 (1973) (finding that EPA has considered cost while
regulating Sulfur Dioxide pollution from Sulfuric Acid factories, even when EPA and the
industry are differing in their opinion about the cost, EPA’s consideration of cost in
rulemaking is enough and does not require cost/benefit analysis).
70
Michigan, 135 S.Ct. 2699.
71
42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).
72
JAMES E. MCCARTHY & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, EPA’S
REGULATION OF COAL-FIRED POWER: IS A “TRAIN WRECK” COMING (2011), https://www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41914.pdf.
73
Id. The Congressional Research Service noted that “[c]oal is an inherently ‘dirty’ fuel.
Burning it produces SO2, NOx, PM, mercury, acid gases, and other pollutants, in greater
abundance than other fossil fuels.” JAMES MCCARTHY & CLAUDIA COPELAND, EPA’S REGULATION OF COAL-FIRED POWER: IS A “TRAIN WRECK” COMING (2011), at 5, https://www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41914.pdf.
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unit than does natural gas.”74 Coal-fired power plants emit significantly more
sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and particulate matter (PM), three
of the six Clean Air Act regulated criteria pollutants, per megawatt hour (Mwh)
of electric power generated compared to natural-gas and oil-fired plants.75
Coal-fired power-generation units emit more hazardous air emissions,
such as mercury, compared to other fossil-fuel power generation technologies.76
Mercury (Hg) is a naturally occurring element,77 released to the environment
in significant quantities through burning coal.78 Mercury is a pollutant which
is regulated as a hazardous chemical by the Clean Air Act.79 A study conducted
by EPA over more than twenty years concluded that the nation’s power plants
using coal as their fuel are the largest source of non-natural mercury deposition
into the environment.80 Mercury’s toxic effects on the human nervous system,
digestive and immune systems, kidneys, lungs, skin, and eyes, lead to premature death of young children and people, and to adverse impact on the
neurological development of the fetus.81
There are 400 coal-powered plants82 which have traditionally supplied
40 percent of U.S. electric power.83 In 19 U.S. states, coal is the dominant source
STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, Thomson Reuters, § 6:22 (46th ed., 201-87).
Id.
76
Environmental Protection Agency, Reducing Toxic Pollution from Power Plants: Epa’s
Proposed Mercury Standards 2 (2011), http://Www3.Epa.Gov/Mats/Pdfs/Presentation.Pdf
(providing hazards linked with coal generation units); JAMES MCCARTHY & CLAUDIA
COPELAND, EPA’S REGULATION OF COAL-FIRED POWER: IS A “TRAIN WRECK” COMING
(2011) at 5, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41914.pdf (supporting coal-linked hazards).
77
Basic Information About Mercury, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/mercury/basic-informat
ion-about-mercury.
78
Id.
79
42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012).
80
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Fact Sheet, Final Consideration of Cost In The Appropriate
And Necessary Findings For The Mercury And Air Toxic Standards For Power Plants,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-05/documents/20160414_mats_ff_fr_fs.pdf;
See Wildlife Guide, http://www.nwf.org/Wildlife/Threats-to-Wildlife/Pollutants/Mercury-andAir-Toxics.aspx (“Coal-fired power plants are the single largest source of mercury
contamination in the U.S., responsible for approximately 50 percent of human-caused
mercury emissions. Other sources include waste incinerators that burn mercury-containing
products and chlorine manufacturers. However, unlike these sources, power plants have not
had to limit their mercury pollution.”).
81
Mercury and health, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, (Mar. 2017), http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs361/en/.
82
John Muyskens, Dan Keating, & Samuel Granados, Mapping How the United States
Generates its Electricity, WASH. POST (July 31, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/national/power-plants/.
83
Joby Warrick, White House Set to Adopt Sweeping Curbs on Carbon Pollution, WASH.
POST (Aug. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/white-hou
74
75
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of electricity and in 13 states it supplies a majority of power generation.84 Half
of the mercury detected in the ambient air in states in the U.S. is from the sources
within that state’s boundary, while the other half migrates in from other upwind
states.85 Human-made sources emitted about 115 tons of mercury, with 42
percent of those tons (48 tons) coming from domestic coal-fired power plants.86
Though power plants were not mandated by other EPA regulation to
reduce mercury emissions per se, power plants indirectly are capturing about
27 tons of mercury per year through the emission controls installed directly to
reduce other emissions of the criteria pollutants nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide,
and particulate matter.87 If coal-fired power plants were not using control
systems to lessen the emission of these other criteria pollutants, total mercury
emissions would be about 75 tons per year.88 Mercury is categorized as a
hazardous emission to the atmosphere that produces many adverse effects on
human health. Congress lists mercury in the list of Hazardous Air Pollutants,
which the EPA has an obligation to regulate under Section 112 of the Clean
Air Act.89 EPA did so both under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, and then
doubled down on the emission of mercury through promulgation of rules under
its Mercury Air Toxic Standards.
Due to the cost of regulation-mandated controls and the decreasing
price of competitive fuels, the deployment of coal has been rapidly decreasing
since 2010, so that it now supplies barely one-third of U.S. power.90 Five years
se-set-to-adopt-sweeping-curbs-on-carbon-pollution/2015/08/01/ba6627fa-385c-11e5-b673
-1df005a0fb28_story.html.
84
Muyskens, Keating, & Granados, supra note 82.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
42 U.S.C. § 7412(b). See Mercury and health, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, (Mar.
2017), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs361/en/. (“Elemental and methyl-mercury
are toxic to the central and peripheral nervous systems. The inhalation of mercury vapor can
produce harmful effects on the nervous, digestive and immune systems, lungs and kidneys,
and may be fatal. The inorganic salts of mercury are corrosive to the skin, eyes and
gastrointestinal tract, and may induce kidney toxicity if ingested. . . . There are several ways
to prevent adverse health effects, including promoting clean energy, stopping the use of
mercury in gold mining, eliminating the mining of mercury and phasing out non-essential
mercury-containing products. Promote the use of clean energy sources that do not burn coal.
Burning coal for power and heat is a major source of mercury. Coal contains mercury and
other hazardous air pollutants that are emitted when the coal is burned in coal-fired power
plants, industrial boilers and household stoves.”).
90
See Wendy Koch, EPA Seeks 30% Cut in Power Plant Carbon Emissions by 2030, USA
TODAY (June, 3, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/06/02/epa-propos
es-sharp-cuts-power-plant-emissions/9859913/ (demonstrating decreased popularity of coal).
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ago, at the end of 2012 there were a total of 1,308 coal-fired generating units
in the United States, totaling 310 GW of capacity. 10.2 GW of which was coalfired capacity that was retired in 2012, and more coal capacity has been retired
each year since.91 Natural gas generation and renewable energy powergenerating capacity have been supplanting coal generation in the last five
years.92 Sixty gigawatts of existing coal-fired power generation capacity will
be shuttered between 2015 and 2020, with 90 percent of this coal decrease
already occurring by the end of 2016.”93 U.S. coal-fired generating capacity is
projected to decrease to 262 gigawatts in 2040, according to U.S. Energy
Information Agency, which would constitute a 15 percent decrease.”94
Next, this article examines the key Obama Administration MATS
regulation, its impact, and how the Supreme Court came to find it in violation
of federal law and remand it.
B. Executive Branch Mercury Air Toxic Standards (MATS)
1. The Rule
Promulgated by EPA, the Mercury Air Toxic Standards (MATS) were
estimated by EPA to “avert up to 11,000 premature deaths, 4,700 heart attacks,
and 130,000 asthma attacks every year.”95 The final rule set standards for all
hazardous air pollutants emitted by coal and oil-fired electric generating units
with a generation capacity of 25 megawatts or greater.96 Promulgated pursuant
to EPA’s authority under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act New Source Performance Standards program and the Clean Air Act Section 112 Hazardous Air
91

AEO2014 Projects More Coal-Fired Power Plant Retirements by 2016 than Have Been Scheduled, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15031.
92
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Natural Gas, Renewables Projected to Provide Larger Shares
of Electricity Generation (May 4, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=21072
(demonstrating how natural gas and renewable energy have been replacing coal).
93
Michael Bastasch, Report: EPA Regulations to Accelerate Coal Plant Shutdowns, THE
DAILY CALLER (Feb. 14, 2014), http://dailycaller.com/2014/02/14/report-epa-regulations-toaccelerate-coal-plant-shutdowns/.
94
Id.
95
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Healthier Americans, http://www3.epa.gov/mats/health.html.
96
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/mats/basic.html; 77 Fed.
Reg. 9,304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63). This affects larger coal
plants, if coal is greater than 10 percent of fuel input, and the unit is greater than 25 Mw
capacity, produces electricity for sale, and supplies more than one-third of its potential output
to any utility power distribution system, unless its annual capacity factor is less than 8 percent
of its capacity rating (i.e. only used for peaking purposes). See 77 Fed. Reg. at 9,309
(supporting air pollutant standards).
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Pollution (“HAPs”) provisions of the Clean Air Act,97 MATS is specifically
aimed at reducing power plants’ emissions of hazardous air pollutants,
including arsenic, chromium, nickel, hydrochloric acid and hydrofluoric acid,
in addition to mercury.98
The rule provides existing electricity generators four years to come into
compliance, with an additional year available to the power plants that FERC
has deemed “reliability-critical,” i.e. essential to maintaining adequate power
supply, voltage, and ancillary support for the nation’s bulk power system or
restarting the electrical network in case of a blackout.99 MATS further provides
that if a source cannot come into compliance within the timeframe allowed,
EPA will determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether and to what extent it will
assess fines or penalties for noncompliance.100
2. The Discretion to Consider Economics of MATS
EPA’s MATS regulation was challenged by Michigan and twenty-two
other states along with some industry stakeholders, arguing that the EPA in
promulgating the rule did not consider cost.101 In Michigan v. EPA, petitioner
stated and other industry stakeholders argued that the EPA’s rules to control
emission of mercury are unreasonable as the rule, according to EPA’s calculations, will require coal-fired power plants to spend about $9.6 billion with the
direct benefit of only $4 to 6 million from the reduction of the directly targeted
mercury.102 This approximates a 1:2000 direct benefit:cost ratio. EPA countered that cost is irrelevant in making a Clean Air Act rule.103 Whenever the
statute is ambiguous, EPA’s argument was that it could interpret and resolve
the ambiguity reasonably within its discretion.104
97

Clean Air Act §§ 111, 112, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412; 78 Fed. Reg. 24073, 24073 (April
24, 2013).
98
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Fact Sheet: Mercury and Air Toxics Standards for Power
Plants, http://www.epa.gov/mats/pdfs/20111221MATSsummaryfs.pdf.
99
Id. at 2.
100
Id.
101
Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2704.
102
Id. at 2705-06 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 9326).
103
Id. at 2706. See 76 Fed. Reg. 24988 (2011) (“We further interpret the term ‘appropriate’
to not allow for the consideration of costs.”); 77 Fed. Reg. 9327 (“Cost does not have to be
read into the definition of ‘appropriate’”).
104
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837 (providing that the Court should accept EPA’s interpretation of
the statutes while making rules, if EPA’s interpretation is reasonable and permissible
interpretation of the ambiguous language when Congress’s intent behind the statute is
unknown.).
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EPA argued that it did not do an analysis of regulation-related cost
because the language of the Clean Air Act does not explicitly require EPA to
consider cost if it finds a new regulation “appropriate and necessary” after
reviewing the results of study requested by 42 U.S.C. 7412(n)(1)(A).105 EPA
argued that section 112(n)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act does not mandate EPA
to consider cost because the word “cost” does not appear in the Act, therefore
without considering cost as a pre-requisite EPA can promulgate additional
restricive rules if it finds such action “appropriate and necessary.”106 In other
words, EPA can regulate mercury from coal-fired power plants whenever it
subjectively deems it “necessary.”107 EPA also asserted that it is “appropriate”
to further restrict mercury emissions because the technology is available and is
in use by many power plants to reduce the emission of mercury.108
Part of the EPA rationale is premised on the asserted ineffectiveness of
prior EPA regulation. The EPA argued that the MATS rule was “necessary”
because earlier regulation, particularly the EPA’s Cross-State Air Pollution
Rule (CSAPR),109 promulgated pursuant to other sections of Clean Air Act, did
not deliver the anticipated reduction of emission of hazardous pollutants
anticipated by the EPA, including mercury, and did not sufficiently reduce
significant risk to public health.110
C. Challenge in the Lower Federal Courts
In 2014, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s MATS
regulation.111 What also made the rule controversial is that the EPA counted
assumed co-benefits associated with ancillary PM2.5 reductions, which were
not covered by the MATS rule which regulated only mercury and hazardous
105

42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (“The Administrator shall perform a study of the hazards to public
health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by electric utility steam generating
units of pollutants listed under subsection (b) of this section after imposition of the requirements
of this chapter. The Administrator shall report the results of this study to the Congress within 3
years after November 15, 1990. The Administrator shall develop and describe in the
Administrator’s report to Congress alternative control strategies for emissions which may warrant
regulation under this section. The Administrator shall regulate electric utility steam generating
units under this section, if the Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary
after considering the results of the study required by this subparagraph.”).
106
77 Fed. Reg. 9326.
107
Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2705.
108
Id. at 2706; 77 Fed. Reg. 9363.
109
See infra Section III(E).
110
77 Fed. Reg. 9310-11.
111
See generally White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014),
rev’d, Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2699.
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emissions, yet PM2.5 comprised the overwhelming majority of all ‘benefits’
attributed to the MATS regulations and counted by EPA.112 PM2.5 is already
otherwise regulated by the EPA under other sections of the Clean Air Act.113
This ancillary indirect “benefit” was not without design. The EPA designed the
MATS rule, in part, to achieve through unilateral executive action PM2.5
emissions reductions that otherwise it could not lawfully compel using
provisions of the Act authorizing direct regulation of criteria pollutants,
including PM2.5.114
The Circuit Court of Appeals found that the MATS regulation was
not arbitrary and capricious under the requirements of the Administrative
Procedures Act because the EPA demonstrated a reasonable connection
between its actions and the record of decision, and it was accorded Chevron
deference to undertake actions.115 Judge Kavanaugh, concurring in part and
dissenting in part in the Circuit opinion, took issue and agreed with the
industry petitioners that the EPA unreasonably and illegally excluded cost
considerations and economic impacts when determining whether the Clean
Air Act Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) regulation of
mercury and other power plant hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) was
“appropriate and necessary.”116
The NAAQS criteria pollutant standards for criteria pollutants in the
statute specifically do not provide for considerations of cost, because the
standard must be set by an ample margin of safety regardless of cost.117 By
112

Susan E. Dudley, OMB’S Reported Benefits of Regulation: Too Good to be True?,
REGULATORY REFORM 29 (2013), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regu
lation/2013/6/regulation-v36n2-4.pdf.
113
See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Particulate Matter, http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/particle
pollution/ (Regulating PM2.5); White Stallion Energy Center LLC, et al. v. Environmental
Protection Agency (12-1100), U.S. CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER, http://www.chamber
litigation.com/cases/white-stallion-energy-center-llc-et-al-v-environmental-protection-agen
cy-epa-12-1100 (upholding Utility MACT).
114
See White Stallion, supra note 113 (describing EPA re-designation of Clean Air Act).
115
White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC, 748 F.3d at 1234.
116
Id. at 1261 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent by Judge
Kavanaugh stated that the majority over-read the ruling in Whitman v. American Trucking
Association, Inc., by ignoring the important difference between how the Clean Air Act
provisions govern NAAQS rulemaking compared to the MACT regulation of power plant
HAPs. Id. at 1265–66 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Whitman majority held that the EPA may not take costs into consideration when setting
NAAQS. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 467 (2001).
117
42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409(b)(1). If an air pollutant is emitted by “numerous or diverse
mobile stationary sources” and the associated air pollutant is “reasonably. . . anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare,” then pursuant to §108(a) of the Clean Air Act, the EPA
must establish NAAQS for those pollutants, and pursuant to §109(b) of the Act, those
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contrast, for MACT regulation of power plant hazardous air pollutants at issue
in the MATS challenge, pursuant to §112(n)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act, contains
more flexible language for the EPA making “appropriate and necessary” regulation.118 When the D.C. Circuit Court upheld MATS applying to existing coaland oil-fired electric generating units, it relied in part upon Supreme Court
precedent in Whitman v. American Trucking Association, establishing that the
EPA is under no obligation to consider costs in establishing HAPS under other
provisions of the Clean Air Act that similarly fail to mention cost as a relevant
consideration.119 On that issue the appellate court split; however, the majority
deferred to the EPA’s technical judgment.120
The power industry, the most capital-intensive in the United States,121
cannot turn on a dime. Over the four years while MATS moved through the
courts, many coal-fired facilities, not knowing whether the challenged regulation would eventually be overturned, complied with the regulation that would
later be stricken.122 Eventually, the rule was overturned and remanded by the
Supreme Court123 after many coal-fired power generators in the nation either
complied or delisted their plants to shut down rather than comply.124

standards must be “requisite to protect public health” with “an adequate margin of safety.”
42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409(b)(1).
118
Id. at § 7412(n)(1)(A). See White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC, 748 F.3d at 1230–31
(reinforcing notion that language within statute is more flexible); History, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/powerplanttoxics/
history.html (supporting flexible language related to regulation). This requires the EPA to
study and issue a report on the public health hazards anticipated to occur as a result of power
plant HAP emissions, and then apply MACT regulation “if” the Administrator finds such
regulation is “appropriate and necessary,” which phrase is not defined. 42 U.S.C.
§7412(n)(1)(A).
119
White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC, 748 F.3d at 1238–39.
120
Id. at 1239-40. This included challenges to the EPA’s determination of what was achievable by the best performing 12 percent of sources (i.e., “the MACT floor”) and the supporting
data. Id. at 1247-48.
121
EDISON ELECTRIC INST., Delivering America’s Energy Future, (Feb. 8, 2017) http://www.
eei.org/resourcesandmedia/industrydataanalysis/industryfinancialanalysis/Documents/Wall
_Street_Briefing.pdf (indicating that EEI members invest $120 billion in 2016 for capital
investments in the electric power sector).
122
See Suzanne Goldenberg & Raya Jalabi, US Supreme Court Strikes Down Obama’s EPA
Limits on Mercury Pollution, THE GUARDIAN (June 29, 2015), http://www.theguardian.
com/environment/2015/jun/29/supreme-court-air-pollution-epa-coal-plants (“According to data
compiled by SNL Energy, many generators in the US complied with the mercury and toxics
compliance, despite the possibility that the court would strike down the rule.”).
123
See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (Overturning and remanding MATS).
124
See Patrick Ambrosio, Supreme Court Remands EPA Mercury Rule For Failing to
Consider Cost to Power Plants, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 30, 2015), https://www.bna.com/
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D. The Elevation of Costs as a New Metric: Supreme Court Decision
This MATS circuit court decision proceeded to the Supreme Court on
appeal by a coalition of more than 20 states.125 In Michigan v. EPA, the
petitioning parties overturned the EPA MATS regulation of mercury and other
hazardous pollutants because:
EPA must consider cost—including cost of compliance—
before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary . . . One would not say that it is even rational, never mind
‘appropriate,' to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in
return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits.126
EPA claimed long-term benefits of $37-90 billion annually, without
providing any statistical basis or proof for its numerical determination. During
oral arguments before the Supreme Court, several members of the Court were
critical of EPA cost-benefit analysis which attributed most of these annual public
health benefits to reduction of fine particulate matter and other pollutants which
were not regulated under this MATS mercury standards, with only $4 to 6
million in benefits resulting directly from reductions of the MATS-regulated
hazardous air pollutants. The Supreme Court found that the application of
“appropriate and necessary” must include considerations of cost.127 The majority
opinion of the Supreme Court concluded that “it is not rational, never mind
‘appropriate,’ to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few
dollars in health or environmental benefits.”128
supreme-court-remands-n17179928911/ (Coal-fired “Plants that were not granted an extension were required to comply with the standards by April 16, 2015, a deadline that required
the installation of billions in pollution controls and factored into the closure of many coalfired power plants. Representatives from American Electric Power, FirstEnergy Corp. and
other utilities told Bloomberg BNA in April that a Supreme Court ruling against the EPA
would come too late to alter plans to close plants or invest in pollution controls.”).
125
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705–06. The Court granted certiorari to, and consolidated three
separate petitions filed by the Utility Air Regulatory Group, the National Mining Association
and 23 states. Id. at 2706. Fifteen states supported the EPA’s MATS regulation before the
Court. See generally Brief in Opposition, Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2699, No. 14-46, 14-47, 1449, (Oct. 15, 2014) (Appellate briefs from various states).
126
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707 (relying on Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States, Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)) (providing that an agency cannot
entirely ignore an important aspect of the problem Congress tasked it with considering).
127
ARNOLD W. REITZE, AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
191-97 (2001).
128
Clean Air Act §§ 172(a) (2), (c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502(a)(2), (c).
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The Supreme Court held that “[in] addition, ‘cost’ includes more than
the expense of complying with regulations; any disadvantage could be termed
a cost.”129 EPA is required to “consider cost—including, most importantly,
cost of compliance—before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and
necessary.”130 Of paramount importance, the Court refused any longer to defer
to EPA concerning the mercury standards.
The Supreme Court did not uphold EPA’s rationale of its own complete
disregard and ignorance of the cost of the MATS rule because it did not support
that the rule is “appropriate and necessary.”131 The Court found that it will never
be found “appropriate” if the return on the investment of billions of dollar is
worth only a few million dollars in health benefit.132 Spending billions of dollars
on one issue based on a rule which does not carefully consider the cost of the
program would be a waste of useful resource; therefore any significant regulation
may require the consideration of cost before the rule is promulgated.133
Section 112(n)(1)(B) of the Clean Air Act, which applies to HAPs,
requires the EPA to conduct a study to determine effects on health and environment from the emission of mercury from sources and consider the available
technologies to control those emissions of mercury and their costs.134 Because
Congress required EPA to perform this study of mercury emission impact on
health and environment, EPA could not persuasively argue that Section
112(n)(1)(B) of the Act allowed EPA to ignore cost in its broad exercise of
administrative discretion under the Chevron deference doctrine.135 Although
129

Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707.
Id. at 2711.
131
Id. at 2707 (citing State Farm, 103 S.Ct. at 2862) (indicating that when the agency’s
actions are arbitrary and capricious and not based on relevant factors).
132
Id.
133
Id. at 2707-08 (citing Energy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1498 (2009)).
134
See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(B) (“The Administrator shall conduct and transmit to the
Congress not later than 4 years after the date of enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, a study of mercury emissions from electric utility steam generating units, municipal
waste combustion units, and other sources, including area sources. Such study shall consider
the rate and mass of such emissions, the health and environmental effects of such emissions,
technologies which are available to control such emissions, and the costs of such
technologies.”). When Congress references cost in section 112(n)(1)(B) and when EPA is
regulating coal-fired power plants based on section 112(n)(1)(A), cost becomes a relevant
factor in any rulemaking affecting coal-fired power plants based on section 112(n)(1).
Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2708.
135
Id. Cf. Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 121 S.Ct. 903, 916 (2001) (providing
that while interpreting provisions of the Clean Air Act to publish ambient air quality
standards with “adequate margins of safety,” the phrase does not require EPA to consider
cost at all, but rather set the value of emissions of health affecting pollutants to a reasonable
level such that it reduces the risk to health.).
130
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other sections of the Clean Air Act expressly do not require EPA to consider
cost while regulating sources other than power plants;136 it was found that EPA
cannot ignore cost where Congress had intended the regulation of power plant
emissions only when “appropriate and necessary.”137
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the administrative record,
created or not created by the agency, matters. While promulgating mercury
emission standards, though EPA did some study to estimate the cost to the
industry, that study was not in the record or the foundation or reason for EPA’s
rule for coal-fired power plant mercury emission restriction. Thus, in Michigan
v. EPA, by a Supreme Court split 5-4 decision, the circuit court opinion
upholding the original MATS regulation was held illegal and remanded to the
D.C. Circuit for redermination based on cost analysis.138 And here, the devil is
136

Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2709-10. While the section of the Clean Air Act regulating sources
other than power plants does not require cost to be considered as a factor and concentrates
on the amount of pollution from the regulated source, a separate section in the Act regarding
power plant regulation makes reference to the consideration of cost as one of the factors
among many, such as effect of pollution on health and environment, makes cost an important
relevant factor that EPA cannot ignore.
137
Id. at 2710; 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(3).
Where EPA neither considered cost at all, “cost of compliance,” nor any findings from the
EPA Regulatory Impact Analysis, none can play any role in EPA’s determination that
electric generation units need to be regulated by a second, additional layer of rules, which
render that MATS rule not “appropriate and necessary.” Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711.
138
Id. at 2709-26. The Court majority decided that the EPA cannot find the MATS Rule
“appropriate and necessary” when EPA has, in its own words, not considered cost at all when
it determined that regulation of coal-powered power plants is required. Id. at 2711. The
majority uses the metaphor of the purchase of a Ferrari by a customer who decided that it is
appropriate to buy a Ferrari—a luxury and expensive automobile—but only considers the
cost at the time of upgrade of its “audio system.” Id. at 2709. EPA’s action is similar to such
buyer, who without consideration of cost, decides that it is appropriate to additionally
regulate coal-powered power plants and will later consider the cost at the time of setting the
limits of emission. The majority noted that the determination of a regulation to be
“appropriate” cannot be validly made in the absence of a threshold cost consideration. Id. at
2710-2711. The minority of the Court, however, interpreted the Clean Air Act § 112(n)(1)(A)
“appropriate and necessary” finding by EPA to not necessarily require an EPA consideration
of cost be the first step in the rule making process. Id. at 2724. The Court dissenters opine
that the majority is at fault by ignoring the EPA’s act of finding that benefits such as about
11,000 less pre-mature deaths per year and avoidance of many serious illnesses outweighs
the cost of the regulation, after it has determined the regulation is “appropriate and
necessary.” Id. at 2721. The dissent supports the EPA’s MATS rule because EPA, after
deciding that regulation is required, has accounted for cost as part of the rule promulgation
process setting the limits. EPA, based on its study, later concluded that the cost of the MATS
regulation would be about $10 billion a year, and then comparing it against various benefits,
with timing and cost as a threshold determination not important. Id. The dissent does not
agree with the majority that the basic cost analysis must be the first step and the prerequisite
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in the details: The Supreme Court did not requre EPA to perform a formal
benefit-cost analysis.139 Rather the decision required the EPA to consider cost,
without restricting the residual Chevron adminstrative deference as to how cost
would be considered by EPA regarding power plants to be regulated by
additional rules for mercury emissions.140
Of note, in reaching its narrowly split decision in Michigan, the
Supreme Court majority cited the dissent of Judge Kavanaugh in the D.C.
Circuit decision in White Stallion Energy Ctr. LLC v. EPA,141 which on appeal
became denominated as Michigan v. EPA.142 Judge Kavanaugh, as part of his
confirmation process after nomination to the Supreme Court, expressly singled
out his dissent in this case as one of the ten most important cases of his career,
stating “the Supreme Court’s majority opinion agreed with and cited my
dissent” in Michigan v. EPA.143 These dynamics take on larger context for the
future longevity of Michigan v. EPA’s new direction in Constitutional and
administrative law, given Judge Kavanaugh’s recent nomination to serve on
the Supreme Court and the importance he attributes to his dissenting decision.
E. Prior Regulatory ‘Benefit’ Precedent in Context: The SIP-CALL,
CAIR, and CSAPR
Three times over the past two decades, pursuant to the Clean Air Act,
EPA has attempted to delineate the Act’s “Good Neighbor Provision” to
prevent upwind drifting pollution to other downwind states by identifying
basis to find the regulation “appropriate and necessary.” Id. at 2724. The dissent is satisfied
if cost is the last step after EPA categorizing the power plants and determining to regulate
the sources of pollution, beyond the floor level, at more stringent standard. Id. at 2726.
139
A cost-benefit analysis quantitatively assigns monetary value to each benefit as a result
of the rule and then compares the total benefit against the total cost.
140
Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2711. Though the majority of the Court remanded the case to the
D.C. Circuit for appropriate action for EPA to consider cost before finalizing a MATS rule,
MATS was not vacated. Id. at 2712. Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion notes that
notwithstanding Chevron deference to the EPA to resolve statutory ambiguity if its
interpretation is reasonable, it is the province of the court “to say what the law is” and not
the agency. Id. at 2712. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (Standing for the
proposition that it is the Court’s ultimate interpretive authority to “say what the law is”).
141
White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d,
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2699.
142
See supra note 116.
143
Fatima Hussein, Kavanaugh Touts Court Loss Among His Highest Accomplishments,
Bloomberg Environment Reporter, July 24, 2018 (“In my view, it was unreasonable—and
therefore unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act—for EPA not to consider the costs
imposed by regulations in determining whether such regulations were ‘appropriate and necessary
. . . . All nine Justices agreed with my position that the statute requires consideration of costs.”).
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when upwind states “contribute significantly” to nonattainment downwind
pollution. First, in 1998, EPA issued a rule known as the “NOX SIP Call” which
limited NOX emissions in 23 upwind States to the extent that such emissions
contributed to nonattainment of ozone standards in downwind States.144 The
D.C. Circuit Court upheld the NOX SIP Call, specifically affirming EPA's use
of costs to determine when an upwind state's contribution was “significan[t]”
within the meaning of the Clean Air Act statute.145
Second, the subsequent Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), promulgated
by EPA in 2005, required 27 upwind states to reduce or eliminate the impact
of upwind sources of pollution on out-of-state downwind nonattainment of
NAAQS for SO2 and NOx.146 States comply by restricting fossil fuel-fired
power plant emissions.147 The D.C. Circuit stuck this CAIR cap-and-trade
regulation as “arbitrary and capricious . . . not otherwise in accordance with the
law,” and “fundamentally flawed.”148 The court also struck CAIR on procedural grounds, finding that the EPA failed to adequately explain how it
determined state emissions budgets and to address provisions of the Clean Air
Act that it was required to enforce independently.149
Third, replacing the judicially-stricken CAIR, the Cross-State Air
Pollution Rule (CSAPR) addressed interstate air transport of SO2 and NOx
contributing to ground-level ozone and fine particle pollution.150 CSAPR, also
promulgated pursuant to the “Good Neighbor” provision of the Clean Air
Act,151 requires 27 states in the eastern half of the country to significantly
improve air quality by reducing power plant emissions that cross state lines and
144

See NOX SIP Call, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,358 (Oct. 27, 1998) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 51, 72, 75, 96) (Limiting NOx emissions in upwind states).
145
Michigan, 213 F.3d 663, 674-679 (2000).
146
North Carolina v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 531 F.3d 896, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2008), modified, 550
F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008). NOx and SO2 were reduced via the 1997 annual and 24-hour fine
particle (PM2.5) and 1997 8-hour ozone NAAQS. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Fact
Sheet: The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule: Reducing the Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone 3 (2011), https://www.epa.gov/csapr/fact-sheet-cross-state-airpollution-rule-reducing-interstate-transport-fine-particulate (Reducing upwind state air pollution sources). CAIR was intended to reduce or eliminate the impact of upwind sources on
attainment of particulate and ozone NAAQS in downwind states.
147
THE WHITE HOUSE, CUTTING CARBON POLLUTION IN AMERICA (2013), https://oba
mawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf.
148
North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 906–08, 918, 929 (citations omitted).
149
Id.
150
EME Homer City Generation L.P, 696 F.3d. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, U.S. EPA v. EME
Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
151
Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)); 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,216
(Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51).
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contribute to ground-level ozone and fine particle pollution.152 CSAPR focused, through addressing interstate pollution, on attainment and maintenance
of the 1997 Ozone NAAQS, 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS, and 2006 PM2.5 NAAQS in
reducing NOx and SO2.153
The CSAPR rule is part of a suite of other state and federal rules that,
together, would result in power plant emissions reductions of 73 percent for
sulfur dioxide and 54 percent for nitrous oxide.154 EPA estimates that if all
affected power plants were in full compliance with CSAPR, “[a]pproximately
70 percent of the power generated from coal-fired power plants [in states
covered by the rule would] come from units with state-of-the-art SO2 controls,”
and roughly 50 percent of that power would “come from units with state-ofthe-art NOX controls.”155
After the second EPA step of the CAIR cap-and-trade rule was stricken
in 2008 by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,156 the D.C. Circuit Court struck
CSAPR because of its flawed method for determining the emission reduction
obligation imposed on states.157 On certiorari, EPA’s CSAPR rule was
subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court, overturning the D.C. Circuit.158
The 6-2 opinion of the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s holding in
2014, reaffirming deference to agency discretion in devising Clean Air Act
regulations, and reinforcing Chevron precedent.159
The majority’s ruling of the Court rejected the D.C. Circuit and
Supreme Court dissenting Justices’ conclusions that EPA is foreclosed from
relying on costs in making its determination, finding nothing in the statutory
152

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Fact Sheet: The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule: Reducing the
Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone 1 (2011), https://www.epa.gov/
csapr/fact-sheet-cross-state-air-pollution-rule-reducing-interstate-transport-fine-particulate.
153
Id. at 3.
154
Id. at 2.
155
Id. at 4.
156
76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,216 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51).
157
EME Homer City Generation, L.P, 696 F.3d at 15-19 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, Envtl. Prot.
Agency v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
158
EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. at1596 (citing Chevron, 467 U. S. 837)
(indicating that the EPA scheme for interstate cross-state pollution was “sensible,” “equitable,” “efficient” and “making good sense[.]”). The majority opinion included two key
holdings: First, it held that the Clean Air Act does not require the EPA to provide upwind
states a second opportunity to file a State Implementation Plan allocating in-state emissions
before issuing a Federal Implementation Plan. Id. Second, the EPA’s Transport Rule, which
allocates emission reductions based on cost effectiveness as opposed to the upwind States’
proportional contributions to downwind states’ pollution, was a reasonable interpretation of
the Good Neighbor Provision of the Act and therefore entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at
1602-1610.
159
Id. (citing Chevron U, 467 U.S. 837).
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language that would preclude that cost consideration.160 It also disagreed with
the D.C. Circuit majority’s conclusion that EPA was required to allocate responsibility for emissions reduction in a manner proportional to each state’s
contribution.161 “Nothing in the text of the Good Neighbor Provision propels
EPA down this path.”162 Additionally, considering the “combined and cumulative
effect of each upwind State’s reductions,” the majority found that the D.C. Circuit’s proportional-reduction approach was neither practical nor mathematically
feasible, and would ultimately lead to costly and unnecessary over-regulation.163
Regarding cross-state pollution covered by CSAPR, 164 the Supreme
Court allowed EPA, in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.,165 to
perform “a cost-effective allocation of emissions reduction responsibilities.”166
The Supreme Court decision in EME Homer contravenes the ruling in Whitman
v. American Trucking Ass’n, Inc., which ruled against taking cost into
consideration when establishing air standards:167 “The CAA [Clean Air Act]
as a whole unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting
process.”168 This applied to a different part of the Act which had the
requirement to set a standard with an “adequate margin of safety.” The Supreme Court overruled the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision, which
asserted that the Act’s standard had no “intelligible principle” to help the EPA
in establishing the NAAQS.169
Based on the inconsistent and somewhat limited success between 1998
– 2014 with these other three Clean Air Act regulations limiting power plant
emissions, EPA promulgated its MATS rule which was estimated to have
approximately $9.6 billion in costs annually versus a direct hazardous pollutant
160

Id.
Id. at 1605.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 1604-06.
164
Clean Air Act, §§ 110(a)(2)(D), 126, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(D), 7426. The Act also
establishes interstate transport commissions, and gives the EPA direct authority to order
individual stationary sources to reduce emissions if they significantly contribute to nonattainment in another state. Clean Air Act § 176A, 42 U.S.C. § 7506a.
165
EME Homer City Generation, L.P, 531 U.S. 457.
166
Adler, supra note 59, at 172-74.
167
Am. Trucking Ass’n. v. EPA, 121 S. Ct. 903, 908 (2001). The courts have noted that costs
can be considered in formulating the SIPs that implement and maintain NAAQS. See, e.g.,
Adler, supra note 59, at 173-74 (highlighting cost benefit analysis for agricultural pesticides).
168
Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1033–34, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
169
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2364 (2001). See
American Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999), reh’g granted in
part and denied in part, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (asserting that the Clean Air Act had no
“intelligible principle” to help the EPA establish NAAQs).
161
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public benefit of $4-5 million annually.170 Based on this modest direct benefit
metric, the costs of complying with the regulation was somewhere between
1,600-2,400 times more than direct benefits of reducing hazardous power plant
air pollution.
IV. THE ‘NEW’ MATH: WHICH COSTS COUNT WHEN THE COURT
ELEVATES COST AS A NEW PRUDENTIAL RULE?
Though EPA stated in Michigan v. EPA that it did not consider cost on
the record while reaching its conclusion that regulation of coal-fired power
plants of capacity more that 25 MW is “appropriate and necessary,”171 EPA, in
fact, conducted a non-record study to find out the cost of the proposed MATS
rule. The study concluded that the available health benefits, including fewer
mercury-related IQ loss in development of children, avoidance of premature
death of 4200-11,000 persons per year, reduced incidences of non-fatal heart
attacks, reduced hospitalizations from cardiovascular and respiratory problems, and hundreds of thousands of lost productive work days, outweighed the
substantial ongoing cost of almost $10 billion per year for compliance.172 The
EPA did the numbers, but did not change its regulatory position: On remand,
EPA evaluated cost metrics, considered public comments, and made findings
that EPA’s regulation of power plants under MATS is justified.173
170

Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
See id. at 2707, 2712 (Supporting notion that EPA did not consider cost when reaching
conclusions about coal power plants).
171

172

77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9306 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 60, 63). Table 2
(Summary of the Monetized Benefits, Social Costs, and Net Benefits for the Final Rule in
2016) provides the following:
[Billions of 2007 $]
3% Discount rate
Total Monetized Benefits
$37 to $90
Partial Hg-related Benefits
$0.004 to $0.006
PM2.5-related Co-benefits
$36 to $89
Climate-related Co-Benefits
$0.36
Total Social Costs
$9.6
Net Benefits
$27 to $80
173

7% Discount rate
$33 to $81.
$0.0005 to $0.001.
$33 to $80.
$0.36.
$9.6.
$24 to $71.

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Fact Sheet, Final Consideration Of Cost In The Appropriate
Necessary Finding For The Mercury And Air Toxics Standards For Power Plants (2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-05/documents/20160414_mats_ff_fr_fs.pdf.
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Presenting those numbers did not change what some saw as an
imbalanced outcome: In its final Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for the
MATS rule, EPA noted that the cost of the program is about $9.6 billion a year
while the total direct and indirect benefits and ancillary co-benefits (from
reduction of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter that were
not the subject of the MATS regulation), is about $37 - $90 billion per year.174
Almost all of the total benefits are from indirect so-called co-benefits totally
unrelated to the regulated mercury chemical. In order to reduce mercury,
operation of high-emission coal-fired power plants is suppressed by the MATS
regulation, which also reduces emission of other pollutants. However,
opponents of the rule claimed that EPA’s consideration of any co-benefit is
faulty because this is double counting of indirect benefits with the actual direct
benefits from what the rule expressly addresses.175
A. Agency Choice of Cost-Benefit Analysis
EPA’s initial study for cost analysis for setting the MATS rule was not
without controversy.176 As noted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office, EPA did not analyze all the options consistently or provide an estimate
of total cost and benefit from each possible option.177 On the cost side of the
ledger, EPA analyzed annual cost and benefit of the cap-and-trade program
along with Clean Air Interstate Rule, but it did not compare technology-based
options in combination with the Interstate Rule.178 EPA considered technology-based options separately for annual cost and benefit calculations, but
did not consider cap-and-trade options separately.179
On the benefit side of the ledger, EPA did not log the value of health
benefits as a direct result of a reduction in mercury, or and how changes in the
reduced mercury emissions will change the cost-benefit ratio for the technology-based options.180 The vast majority of the benefits that EPA counted
174

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL MERCURY
AND AIR TOXIC STANDARDS ES-1 (2011).
175
IER President Releases Statement on New EPA Regs, INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY RES. (Dec. 21,
2011), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/press/ier-president-statement-on-new-epa-regs/.
176
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CLEAN AIR ACT: OBSERVATIONS ON EPA’S COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ITS MERCURY CONTROL OPTIONS (Feb. 2005), http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d05252.pdf.
177
Id. at 8-9.
178
Id. at 8.
179
Id. at 8. Cf. Ted Gayer & Robert Hahn, The Political Economy of Mercury Regulation,
REGULATION, 2005, at 26, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/20050708_
MercuryRegulation.pdf (Explaining technology-based options for cost-benefit calculations).
180
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 176 at 12-13.
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were from reduction from particulate matter and unrelated to the mercury
which was being regulated by the rule.181 EPA did not consider some of the key
uncertainties affecting its cost-benefit analysis.182 After remand in Michigan v.
EPA, reviewing public comments both in favor and against the MATS rule, EPA
conducted cost analysis based on four different metrics, and calculated that direct
mercury benefits plus indirect co-benefits still outweighed the cost, concluding
that the MATS rule is “appropriate and necessary.”183
Mercury is listed as a Hazardous Air Pollutant in the Clean Air Act
Section 112(b)(1).184 EPA proposed two options to control the emission of
mercury from coal-fired power plants, which are the most significant source
of mercury pollution.185 One of the options is the application of control technology, while the other is participation in a cap-and-trade option.186 However,
EPA evaluated technology-based options alone, while the cost-benefit for the
cap-and-trade program was examined with the separate Interstate Rule.187
EPA estimated the cost of the technology-based options at approximately $2 billion per year with benefits of about $15 billion a year.188 Costbenefit from the cap-and-trade plus Interstate Rule was $3 to 5 billion per-year
cost and $58-73 billion a year of benefits.189 Because the cost-benefit from the
cap-and-trade option was considered along with the Interstate Rule, it does not
help others to choose the correct option between the two available options—
technology-based or cap-and-trade.190
B. The Algorithm: Dissecting Math
Historically, EPA focused on percentage mercury reduction targets.
EPA, in January 2004, had proposed a technology-based option to reduce the
mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants by about 30% from the then181

Id. at 4.
Id. at 14.
183
81 Fed. Reg. 24,420, 24,422 (Apr. 25, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63), https://
www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20568&dis
position=attachment&contentType=pdf.
184
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 §(b)(1); Alexander F. Gruss, Mercury Removal from
Simulated Coal-Fired Power Plant Flue Gas Using UV Irradiation and Silica-Titania
Composites 11-12 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida) (on file
with the University of Florida), http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0043294/00001.
185
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 176 at 1.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 8.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 9.
182
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current 48 tons per year, to achieve a reduction to 34 tons per year by 2008.191
In addition, EPA enacted the Clean Air Interstate Rule to reduce emissions of
nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide, which also indirectly reduced mercury
emissions to 34 tons per year by 2010.192 CAIR employs a cap-and-trade
system to reduce nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide by 70 percent.193
A clear comparison of costs was controversial. Since the reduction of
mercury from the technology-based option and the Interstate Rule previously
calculated by EPA is in the same range and EPA’s flawed study of both
the options--not considering the technology-based option with the Interstate
Rule and not considering cap-and-trade option alone—make comparison
difficult.194 EPA also did not calculate economic benefits of mercury reduction
alone.195 Because the direct benefits from toxic mercury were not estimated
and all the benefits which EPA calculated and relied on to find the MATS rule
“appropriate and necessary” were from the indirect reduction of the co-benefit
non-toxic criteria pollutants of nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxides, and particulate
matter as co-benefits, opponents alleged double-counting of co-benefits by
EPA in disguise.196 Opponents of the MATs rule argued that EPA’s unconventional counting likely exaggerated the benefits.
1. Metrics and Cost: Agency and Stakeholder Arguments
Back to the drawing board in present tense. EPA did an evaluation of
the cost of the MATs rule based on four different metrics.197 The EPA first
considered cost based on historical annual revenue and second based on annual
191

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 176 at 6.
Id. at 7
193
Regulations: Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), MARSULEX ENVTL TECH., http://www.
met.net/clean-air-interstate-rule.aspx.
194
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 176 at 8-9.
195
Id. at 12.
196
See Michigan v. EPA: Costs and Benefits Matter, U.S. SENATE (July 9, 2015), https://
www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/michigan-v-epa-costs-and-benefits-matter (explaining how
opponents can use the case to argue that a federal court should delay implementation of the
CO2 rule until all legal proceedings are complete). Chief Justice Roberts, with the majority,
questioned the “dramatic disparity” between MATS compliance cost which EPA projected to be
$9.6 billion dollars and any benefits due to the reduction in mercury and HAPs in the range of $4
to $6 million per year. Id. The majority of the benefits are ancillary co-benefits as a result of
reduction in criteria air pollutants. With no meaningful benefit from HAP control, it is a question
“whether it’s an illegitimate way of avoiding the different limitations.” Id.
197
80 Fed. Reg. 75, 025 (Dec. 1, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63), https://www.regu
lations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20497.
192
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capital expenditure of the power plant industry.198 Third, EPA reviewed the
impact of the rule on retail electricity prices, and fourth, considered any adverse
impact on the power industry.199 EPA concluded that under each metric, the
cost of mercury control is reasonable, and thereunder the power industry would
be able to maintain its normal operation.200 EPA claimed that it did not receive
any information that contradicts its finding of the cost to the program.201
EPA noted that the MATS rule assists in the “prompt, permanent, and
ongoing reductions in hazardous air pollutants” and the associated unquantified
advantages to the “most exposed and most sensitive members of society”
outweighs the cost.202 The EPA also conducted a formal benefit-cost analysis
for regulatory impact analysis (RIA) and compared the cost against total direct
plus co-benefits (monetized and non-monetized) to find that total benefits
including adding in all co-benefits are substantial and outweigh the costs.203
EPA estimated that the compliance cost of the MATs rule is approximately
$9.6 billion per year.204
198

Id. at 75,032-34.
Id. at 75,035-36.
200
Id. at 75,036.
201
Id. at 75,035.
202
Id. at 75,030.
203
80 Fed. Reg. 75, 025, supra note 197, at 75,039, 75,041. For formal Benefit-Cost Analysis,
EPA in its economics analysis attempts to quantify all significant benefits derived from the action
in monetary terms to determine whether the “action increases cost-effectiveness.” Id. The
program is cost-effective if Willingness-To-Pay for an action by the people benefitting from the
program exceeds Willingness-To-Pay to avoid the action by the people disadvantaged by the
program. Id. By monetizing, i.e. assigning, a dollar value to each consequence, if the benefit
exceeds cost, it improves economic efficiency. Id. OMB Guidelines and Executive Orders instruct
agencies to consider both monetized and non-monetized benefits. Id; U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, Fact Sheet, Guidelines for Prep-aring Economic Analyses, EPA-240-R-10-001 (Dec.
17, 2010), http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0568-50.pdf/$file/EE-0568-50.pdf.
204
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Mats Base Case, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2015-08/mats_base_case_0.zip [hereinafter MATS Base Case zip files] (quantifying base
case cost of rule); IPM Analysis of the Final Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS), U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/ipm-analysis-final-mercury-and-airtoxics-standards-mats [hereinafter MATS Base Case excel files] (comparing Base case model run,
including the national Title IV SO2 cap and trade program, NOX State Implementation Plan (SIP)
Call regional ozone season cap and trade program, Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), and
settlements and state rules through December 2010 impacting SO2, NOX, and directly emitted
PM, and CO2, to results with MATs in place). EPA analyzed the impact of MATS on the U.S.
electric power generation industry and followed version 4.10_MATS of the Integrated Planning
Model (IPM) to compare the difference of the annual cost to the power industry with and without
the MATS Rule with all costs and prices expressed in 2007-year dollars. MATS Base Case zip
files, supra note 204, at mats_base_case_0.zip, mats_policy_Case_0.zip; MATS Base Case excel
files, supra note 204, at MATS_Base_case.xls, MATS Policy Case.xls. The MATs Base Case
199
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In response to the cost estimate, the electric power and the coal industries
did not dispute the EPA cost.205 The Electric Reliability Coordinating Council
(ERCC),206 Murray Energy Corporation which had been a signficant challenger
to several EPA rules,207 Duke Energy Corporation,208 and National Economic
IPM includes in its determination of what criteria pollutant levels would be in the base case
without MATS, the legal effect of the the Clean Air Act’s Title IV sulfur dioxide cap-and-trade
program, nitrogen oxide State Implementation Plan (SIP Call) regional ozone season cap-andtrade program, the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) as finalized in July 2011, and
settlements and state rules through December 2010 impacting emissions of sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen oxide, directly emitted particulate matter, and carbon dioxide. MATS Base Case zip files,
supra note 204, at mats_base_case_0.zip, mats_policy_Case_0.zip. According to the result of
EPA’s IPM data run, the total cost to the power industry without the MATs rule is $144.25 billion
in 2015, $155.32 billion in 2020, and $201.35 billion in 2030. Id. With the MATs rule in place,
the cost to the power generator industry is $153.63 billion in 2015, $163.96 billion in 2020, and
$208.74 billion in 2030. Id. The difference in cost with and without MATs in force was
approximately $9.6 billion in 2015. EPA clarified that the annual $9.6 billion dollars required
consists of annual production and capital costs to the power industry for the year 2015, and this
represents the largest decrease of total annual output and capital cost of $31.8 billion dollars to
the most significant increase of total of annual output and capital cost of $32.9 billion dollars. 81
Fed. Reg. 24,431, 24,433 (Apr. 25, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
205
See NERA Economic Consulting, Energy and Consumer Impacts of EPA’s Clean Power
Plan (Nov. 7, 2015), http://www.americaspower.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/NERACPP-Final-Nov-7.pdf (providing overview of Clean Power Plan impacts). NERA’s analysis
projects that EPA’s Clean Power Plan will cost consumers and businesses as much as $39
billion a year, far outpacing the costs of compliance for all EPA rules for power plants in
2010 ($7 billion) and the annual cost of the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards rule ($10
billion). Id. See BLAIR BEASLEY, ET AL., MERCURY AND AIR TOXIC STANDARDS ANALYSIS
DECONSTRUCTED: CHANGING ASSUMPTIONS, CHANGING RESULTS (Apr. 2013), http://www.
rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-13-10.pdf (demonstrating that actual regulations are more flexible than most models, which leads to a smaller impact on the
electricity generating fleet).
206
Jeff Holmstead, counsel to the Electric Reliability Coordinating Council (ERCC), testified
before U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Clear Air
and Nuclear Safety, on April 17, 2012, that “EPA itself estimates that the cost will be roughly $10
billion a year, but many experts believe the actual cost will be significantly higher.” Jeffrey R.
Holmstead, Counsel, Electric Reliability Coordinating Council (ERCC), Review of Mercury
Pollution’s Impacts to Public Health and the Environment, Before the Subcommittee on Clear
Air and Nuclear Safety (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/663
18c87-2b64-4c85-9a57-c569c6b61a5a/41712hearingwitnesstestimonyholmstead.pdf.
207
Letter from Gary M. Broadbent, Assistant General Counsel and Media Director, Murray
Energy Corporation to Administrator McCarthy, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=E
PA-HQ-OAR-2009-023420536&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentT
ype=pdf (“While $9 billion averages only $30 per person if that cost was evenly spread, you know
that the costs will be very heavily concentrated on particular regions and communities.”).
208
Letter from J. Michael Geer, Manager of Environmental Programs, Duke Energy Business
Services, to the Honorable Janet McCabe, Assistant Administrator for the Office of Air and
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Research Association (NERA)209 all submitted that they thought the EPA cost
was within the correct zone of value. Some emission control companies which
sell pollution control technologies that would be required to be purchased
pursuant to the MATs rule, predicted that the cost of compliance would be less
than EPA’s estimate due to the advancement of technology.210
2. Absolute Cost
On one level, there is the issue of absolute costs to industry compared
to an esitmate of health and environmental benefits for the public. This is a
comparison of economic expense and assumed health benefits. EPA’s MATS
rule’s compliance cost is a a “small fraction” of the annual revenue of the
power industry.211 Resources For the Future (RFF) estimated that MATS comRadiation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/
contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20550&attachmentNumber=1&disp
osition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
209
AMERICAN COALITION FOR CLEAN COAL ELECTRICITY, STATUS OF MAJOR EPA REGULATIONS AFFECTING COAL-FIRED ELECTRICITY GENERATION (2015), http://www.americaspow
er.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/EPA-Regulations-January-2015.pdf.
210
See Brief of Emission Control Companies as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents
and in Support of Affirmance, Michigan v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 135 S.Ct. 2699 (2015) (No.
14-46, 14-47, 14-49), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_
court_preview/BriefsV5/14-46_amicus_resp_ecc.authcheckdam.pdf (predicting that costs
of compliance will quickly decrease once the market responds to regulations with novel
solutions). FirstEnergy, a utility, determined in 2013 that its compliance cost for the MATS
rule was around $465 million dollars across its entire generation fleet compared to its original
estimate of $2-$3 billion. See Power Companies’ Declining Estimates of the Compliance
Costs of the Mercury & Air Toxics Standards (MATS), MATS (2014), http://blogs.edf.
org/climate411/files/2014/05/Declining-costs-of-MATS-compliance.pdf (“Annual operating expenses have been reduced through our continued focus on managing fuel costs and O&M
expense. And more importantly, our projected capital spending in the generation group over the
next several years has been reduced by more than $1 billion through our recent actions. This
includes additional reductions in our expected spend for compliance with Mercury and Air Toxics
Standards, which is now at $465 million across the entire generation fleet, with only an estimated
$240 million at our competitive units.”). American Electric Power, another utility, also predicted
that it can reduce the compliance cost as a result of technology improvements. See id. (“During
2012 Q4 Earning Call, Nicholas K. Akins, CEO, AEP stated “We believe from a compliance
standpoint that we can achieve further compliance reductions as a result of technology improvements, but also how we run the generation.”).
211
Revenue of the power industry from annual retail sales varies between $277.2 billion in
2000 to $356.6 billion in 2008, rendering the compliance cost only 2.7-3.5 percent of the
annual electricity sales revenue from the year 2000 through 2011. See Supplemental Finding
That It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and
Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 75033, Table 2 (proposed
Dec. 1, 2015) (demonstrating compliance cost of MATS rule). America Electric Power
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pliance cost will result in the reduction of industry profit of about $3-$5 billion
in the year 2020.212 EPA also compared the compliance cost to the power
industry’s annual capital expenditure during years 2000 through 2011, and
found that the cost of MATS compliance is about 26 percent of this historic
total annual capital expenditure of the power industry.213
EPA concluded that MATS compliance costs were reasonable as the
incremental compliance cost of $2.4 billion dollars in the year 2015 is “a small
fraction – about 3.0 percent“ of the overall capital expenditure by the power
industry.214 RFF, based on the HAIKU electricity market model,215 approxiCompany’s revenue ranged between $12.622-17.020 billion for years 2006 through 2015.
See American Electric Power Inc, MORNINGSTAR (2017), http://financials.morningstar.com/
ratios/r.html?t=AEP; Duke Energy is spending about $525 to $625 million dollars over the
period of 10 years for MATS Rule compliance (supporting Duke Energy spending). See
MATS, supra note 210 (emphasizing that its revenue ranged from $12.720-$24.598 billion
for 2006 through 2015).
212
Dallas Burtraw et al., Reliability in the Electricity Industry under New Environmental
Regulations, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (May 2012), at 2, http://www.rff.org/files/shar
epoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-12-18.pdf.
213
First Energy reported an estimated annual capital expenditure of $1.315-3.312 billion over a
decade spanning 2006 to 2015. See FirstEnergy Corp, MORNINGSTAR (2017), http://finan
cials.morningstar.com/ratios/r.html?t=FE (First Energy projected it would cost about $465
million for its entire generation fleet, reduced from its original estimate of $925 million. However,
the cost reduced due to the closure of plants rather than reduced costs of compli-ance, and focused
effort on “managing fuel costs and O&M expense.”). Murray Energy Corporation, a privately
held corporation, claims that for the Sun Electric System, representing five electric utilities in the
Southeast, compliance will cost $12.5 billion, a 25% increase in the capital expenditure cost. See
Broadbent supra note 207 (discussing how costs will be concentrated on particular regions and
communities). Private sector power companies testified that subjecting power plants to Section
112 would “result in capital expenditures of something like $12.5 billion for us, for a 25 percent
rate increase . . . basically it triples the cost of compliance.” See Energy Policy Implications of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resources, 101st Cong. 7, 234–35, 240–41, 436–37, 483, 485, 492, 570–72, 596, 603 (1990)
(providing the bipartisan hearing featuring testimony on various bills).
214
For an estimate of the annual capital expenditures of the power industry at $120 billion
annually, see Delivering America’s Energy Future: Electric Power Industry Outlook, EDISON
ELECTRIC INST., Appendix A (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.eei.org/resourcesandmedia/indu
strydataanalysis/industryfinancialanalysis/Documents/Wall_Street_Briefing.pdf.
215
RFF’s HAIKU electricity model “simulates equilibrium in regional electricity markets
and inter-regional electricity trade with an integrated algorithm for generation capacity
investment and retirement and emissions control technology choice. The model has been
used for a number of reports and articles that appear in the peer-reviewed literature . . .
calculates electricity demand, electricity prices, the consumption of electricity supply, interregional electricity trading activity among 20 regions of the country, and emissions of key
pollutants such as N0x, SO2, mercury and CO2 from electricity generation.” Maryland
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), CENTER FOR INTEGRATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
RESEARCH (Aug. 4, 2011), http://cier.umd.edu/RGGI/modeling_details.html. See also
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mated an annual capital cost for incremental investments for pollution control
of about $5.1-$5.4 billion by the year 2020.216 RFF estimated that in the year
2020, the incremental spending on new generation system would reach a
capital cost of $25 billion without pollution control regulations such as MATS
and CSAPR.217
3. Derivative Regulatory Costs to Consumers
A state Attorney General commented that the purchase of electricity is
not a “discretionary” expense, and therefore impact on the customers of a price
increase is “an important aspect of the problem” requiring due analysis to meet
the directive of the Supreme Court in Michigan v. EPA.218 EPA considered
changes in the resultant electricity rates billed to consumers.219 EPA’s MATS
Regulatory Impact Analysis projected an increase in price of $0.003/kwh or a
3.1 percent increase in average retail electricity costs.220 EPA noted historical
electricity price fluctuations between $-0.0013/kwh to $0.0052/kwh for a
period spanning the year 2000 through 2011.221 Using this historic range, any
increase in electricity rates the consumer is paying is projected to be within this
traditional range of price fluctuation in recent years.222 Over three-years of a
MATS compliance period, EPA noted that the critical power generation
reserve margin would be maintained as needed, and that demand for electricity
would be unaffected while the power industry complies with the MATS rule.223
RFF estimated a rise of about 1 percent in the national average
electricity prices as a result of required MATS compliance costs, and no net
impact on electricity prices from compliance with the CASPR rules.224 RFF
Anthony Paul, Haiku the RFF electricity market model (Jan. 11, 2011), http://cedmcenter.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Paul.pdf (PowerPoint on RFF electricity market model).
216
Burtraw, supra note 212.
217
Id. See also Supplemental Finding supra note 211, at Table 3 (listing total Capital Expenditures
for the Electric Power, Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Sector, 2000 to 2011).
218
Letter from Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General, State of Arkansas, to Gina McCarthy,
Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.
gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20555&attachmentNumber=1&
disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
219
Supplemental Finding, supra note 211.
220
Id.
221
Id. at Table 4.
222
Id.
223
Regulatory Impact Analysis for Final Mercury and Air Toxic Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY (Dec. 2011), at 26, https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/matsriafinal.pdf.
224
RFF infers that “forcing coal units to comply with the MATS SO2 standard or requiring
SCR retrofits also decreases coal generation because of the retirement of coal-fired capacity,”

144

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[Aug. 2018

predicted that in regions where electricity is sold competitively, in about onequarter of the states, there would be no change in the electricity prices due to
the MATS rule and a decline in Clean Air Act Title IV sulfur dioxide allowances.225 In other areas characterizing the majority of states with traditional
cost-of-service regulation, RFF estimated a price increase of about 2.5 percent,
from $83/MWh to $85/MWh in the cost of retail electricity.226
National Economic Research Associates (NERA) modeled impacts of
MATS and CSAPR together and found that increase in electricity prices would
be 11.5%, while “heavy manufacturing states” like Ohio could face from
MATS an increase in retail price up to approximately 23%.227 EPA was
criticized for not disaggregating the retail price of electricity price fluctuation
data at a “smaller scale than nationally” in order to display some out-of-norm
regional data.228 The Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) contended that
the projected price increase of $0.003/kwh is double the average price increase
for the eleven year period over which EPA collected retail pricing data–
$0.0016/kwh.229
Price increase due to the MATS rule, when added to the average standard price increase, was contended to be “far out of line with prior increases.”230
UARG claimed that power generators retired because of the MATS rule are
but the reduction in electricity generation from coal is made up almost entirely by increased
natural gas generation. Burtraw, supra note 212, at Figure 1.
225
Id.
226
Calpine Corporation, Exelon Corporation, and Public Service Enterprise Group, Inc. also
supported the EPA’s estimated price change due to MATS is well within the price differences
over the last many years. Id. “Actual data available in the years since EPA reaffirmed the
Finding in 2011 support EPA’s conclusion about the reasonableness of projected retail
impacts. Annual electricity price data are available from the EIA through 2014. The average
retail electricity price was 9.33 cents/kWh in 2011, 9.04 cents/kWh in 2012, 9.10 cents/kWh
in 2013, and 9.28 cents/kWh in 2014. Thus, the net change in average retail electricity price
from 2011 to 2014 was a decrease of 0.05 cents/kWh, even while many sources were
incurring costs to comply with MATS. Moreover, the year-to-year changes from 2011 to
2014 – a decrease of 0.29 cents kW/h in 2012, then increases of 0.06 and 0.18 cents/kWh –
were all well within the range seen in the prior decade. Thus, these more recent data also
show that a 0.3 cents/kWh increase in electricity prices remains within the historical range
of year-to-year variations and is reasonable.” Id.
227
Letter from Paul A. Yost, Vice President of Energy and Resources Policy, National
Association of Manufacturers, to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Aug. 4, 2011),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-176
40&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (citing a report by
NERA, which approximates the cost of compliance to be approximately $18 billion for
MATS and CSAPR together, and the increase in electricity price to be about 11.5 percent).
228
Burtraw, supra note 212, at 18.
229
Id. (citing data available in Supplemental Finding, supra note 211).
230
Id.
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ten times the amount that EPA estimated.231 UARG contended that EPA’s
comparison of the retirement of “coal-fired generation capacity” is arbitrary
because each coal-fired power plant serves a unique purpose for the grid and
EPA failed to include location as a factor affecting reliability and retirement of
power generators.232
4. Disputed Costs
EPA stated in a Supplemental Finding issued in December 2015 that “no
commenter provided any evidence or information that convinced the EPA that
the preferred approach to consideration of cost is inadequate or unreasonable.”233
Of note, Murray Energy Corporation (“Murray”), in its formal comments to
EPA, listed multiple factors which EPA did not consider in finding the cost of
the regulation was reasonable: This included omission of costs imposed on state,
local, and tribal governments, impact of cost on particular regions, sectors, and
entities, impact on dislocated workers from closure of old and small-capacity
power plants, and the unique nature and characteristics of the power plant
industry.234 Murray claimed that EPA, while considering cost under section
112(n)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act, omitted any consideration of the cost under
section 112(f) of the Act.235 Murray based this argument on the Michigan
Court’s explicit order to EPA to consider the cost of compliance, which Murray
asserted includes any potential cost of compliance with section 112(f) of the Act
in 2020: Murray asserted that ignoring the cost of compliance in 2020, per
section 112(f), is “the same reversible error” which led to the Supreme Court
reversal in Michigan v. EPA.236
Murray also alleged that EPA failed to consider the impact on state and
local government public utilities providing public power.237 Murray commented
that the Michigan Court required EPA to act reasonably238 to “prepare and
consider estimates of the budgetary impact of regulations containing Federal
mandates upon State, local, and tribal governments . . . before adopting such
regulations, and ensuring that small governments are given special consideration
231

Id.
Id.
233
Supplemental Finding, supra note 211, at 34.
234
Broadbent, supra note 207.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
See Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2708 (holding that the EPA acted unreasonably when it did
not include cost consideration in its decision to regulate power plants).
232

146

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[Aug. 2018

in that process.”239 EPA countered these allegations of Murray regarding such a
requirement by citing purported EPA authority under Clean Air Act section
112(n)(1)(A), of “Congress’s open-ended instruction to the Administrator to
determine whether a regulation of EGUs is ‘appropriate and necessary,’” and
EPA’s conclusion that all monetized and non-monetized benefits outweigh the
cost, given the balancing test articulated in Chippewa v. FERC.240
Other commenters criticized the EPA cost analysis. The Director of the
Ohio environmental agency stated that data used by EPA was flawed and
outdated, and EPA should have done cost analysis “based on the actual data
that included only the cost impacts on the portion of the industry actually
affected by the rule.”241 ARIPPA, a non-profit trade association, after the
239

The increased cost will force local governments to raise local property taxes, and reduction in essential services will affect the real estate industry. Thus, while considering alleged
health hazards and substantial potential reductions in HAPs, compliance costs, and “costs of
mercury controls developed under the Mercury Study, costs of other HAPs controls, and the
Acid Rain Program costs” and ignoring other factors, EPA’s cost analysis in not
“meaningful” but in fact “arbitrary and capricious” because the alleged balancing efforts are
“indecipherable.” See Makram B. Jaber and Elizabeth L. Horner, Counsel to the Utility Air
Regulatory Group, Comments of the Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) In Response to
the Environmental Protection Agency’s Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate and
Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility
Steam Generating Units, Before the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, (Apr. 17, 2012),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-205
36&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf. (citing Volkman v.
Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1092 (7th Cir. 2013)) (providing a balancing test implicitly requires
courts “to weigh factors against each other, rather than to merely count how many factors
line up on each side—one factor of great weight may offset several which lean slightly in the
other direction.”). The EPA’s proposed rule does not offer sufficient explanation as to the
specific weight EPA gave to each variable or how they are considered in relation to each
other, and should, therefore, requires formal Cost-Benefit Analysis for determining the rule’s
“appropriate and necessary” justification. See Comments by the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality (TCEQ), Texas Railroad Commission, and Texas Public Utilities
Commission Regarding the Proposed Supplemental Finding that it is Appropriate and
Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal and Oil Fired Electric Utility
Steam Generating Units (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?doc
umentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20534&attachmentNumber=2&disposition=attachment
&contentType=pdf (providing transcript of Texas Air Quality Commission’s Comments).
240
Chippewa v. FERC, 325 F.3d 353, 357-59 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
241
When EPA restricted the public comments limited to the “consideration of cost aspect
presented in the proposed supplementary finding” (80 Fed. Reg. 75028) and excluding
“EPA’s use of identified environmental harms as a basis for finding it appropriate and
necessary to regulate HAP emissions from EGUs” inter alia “EPA’s use of certified data
submitted by regulated parties” and more, EPA failed to adhere to clear guidance from the
Michigan Court. Letter from Scott J. Nally, Director, Ohio EPA, to the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (Jan. 15, 2016) (on file with the EPA Docket Center), https://www.reg
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Michigan Court decision asserted that “‘cost’ includes more than the expense
of complying with regulations; any disadvantage could be termed cost.”242
Many commenters insisted that EPA must perform formal benefit-cost analysis
and should ignore any benefit that can not be measured in monetary units and
should not count any benefits that result from the reduction of non-HAP
emissions—i.e. EPA should not count ‘co-benefits’ of any reduced criteria
pollutants which are not regulated by the MATS rule, which were indispensible
for EPA to not have costs exceed direct benefits by more than 1000:1.243
V. DISPUTED INCLUSION OF INDIRECT ‘CO-BENEFITS’ NOT THE
SUBJECT OF THE REGULATION
A. The Technology of ‘Co-Benefits’
If cost and benefit now matter legally, the math by which each is calculated determines the final cost-benefit tally and comparison. The algorithm and
mathematical operations used to calculate costs and benefit are not without
controversy. How one performs the mathematical operations can change and
determine the result.
Several members of the Michigan Court “were critical that the EPA’s
cost-benefit analysis for the MATS rule attributed billions in annual public
health benefits to the standards, even though the agency could only quantify
between $4 million and $6 million in benefits to reduction of hazardous air
pollutants.”244 Chief Justice Roberts questioned the legitimacy of counting
ulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20560&attachment
Number=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
242
Letter from George Ellis, Executive Director, ARIPPA, to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?document
Id=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20535&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&con
tentType=pdf. See also Michi-gan v. EPA: Costs and Benefits Matter, SENATE REPUBLICAN
POLICY COMM. (July 9, 2015), http://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/michigan-v-epacosts-and-benefits-matter (providing background on cost benefit analysis related to
Michigan court decision). The particular metrics chosen by EPA do not consider the
disadvantages from the plant closure as a cost, but the closure of the plant is considered by
EPA as impacting the reliability and availability of electricity and any interruption due to
closure, ignoring other associated problems such as job loss caused by plant closures. See
Broadbent, supra note 207 (discussing how costs will be concentrated on particular regions
and communities).
243
Jaber & Horner, supra note 239.
244
Patrick Ambrosio, Supreme Court Remands EPA Mercury Rule for Failing to Consider
Cost to Power Plants, BNA DAILY ENVTL REP. (June 30, 2015), http://www.bna.com/
supreme-court-remands-n17179928911/.
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benefits from reduction of fine particulate matter and other pollutants that are
regulated under other sections of the Clean Air Act.245 Is this the correct math
if more than 99% of the assumed benefits are not related to what the regulation
regulates? The EPA claimed long-term direct plus indirect co-benefits of $37–
90 billion annually, without providing any statistical basis or medical proof.246
The only pollutant regulated, mercury, under the MATS rule imposed costs
more than 1000 times that of the modest $4-6 million in direct benefits from
reduced mercury. To change the outcome, EPA added in to the ‘benefits’
column additional economic value from other co-benefits of additional
pollutants incidentally likely to be reduced when coal-fired plants could not
meet the standard and had to cease operations.
Worth noting, the Michigan Supreme Court decision does not require
EPA to conduct formal cost-benefit analysis. The Michigan Supreme Court
decision leaves the decision on how to account for cost to EPA: “[i]t [would]
be up to the Agency to decide . . . how to account for cost.”247 OMB regulations
expressly require agencies to apply cost-benefit analysis for regulations
impacting the economy to the degree of magnitude that the MATS rule does.
Therefore, EPA performed a formal cost-benefit analysis and again found that
cost is substantially outweighed by the total monetized and non-monetized
benefits, if and only if co-benefits are added, in its MATS RIA.248 On remand,
after consideration of cost based on the four metrics, EPA found that total
benefits of the regulation—monetized and non-monetized—ranged between
$37-$90 billion per year compared to the cost of implementation of $9.6 billion
per year. EPA reaffirmed its earlier finding that the MATS rule is appropriate
and necessary when its cost is of this volume weighed against benefits, as
required by the Clean Air Act section 112(d).249
245

Id.
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706.
247
Id. at 2311.
248
Supplemental Finding, supra note 211, at 35.
249
CAA Section 112(d)-Emission Standards, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (last
updated Feb. 23, 2016), https://www3.epa.gov/airtoxics/112dpg.html. Some commenters
like Exelon Corporation, Calpine Corporation, PSEG, National Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), supported EPA’s selected metrics as the real compliance cost, which consists of
amortized capital, cost associated with changes in fuel price, Variable Operating and
Maintenance cost (VOM), and Fixed Operating and Maintenance (FOM) of MATS Rule as
just $2 billion dollar instead of $9.6 billion dollar. See, e.g., Letter from Citizens for
Pennsylvania’s Future et al., to Nick Hudson, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Jan.
15, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-20090234-20558&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (providing
commentary on EPA coal and oil regulations). The reduced cost is based on Andover
Technology Partners’ analysis of compliance cost. Calpine agreed with EPA’s use of data
246
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Drilling down a level deeper, this MATS reglation of mercury is
expected to cause many coal-fired power faciities to either close or operate
signficantly less, so all air emission pollutants they emit will be reduced from
business-as-usual. Counting particulate matter and SO2 reductions, both of
which are produced in abundance by coal-fired power plants compared with
gas-fired power plants,250 and are not regulated by MATS, these comprise
99.9% of the EPA-estimated co-benefits of the MATS regulation.251 When less
than 0.001 of the benefit is related to what the rule regulates, whether cobenefits can be included in the algorithm comes into sharp focus. Natural gas
combustion produces significantly less emissions of CO2 and less of four of
the six criteria air pollutants emitted from fossil-fuel fired power generation:
•

the amount of carbon dioxide produced by natural gas is about
25% less than oil and almost half as much as coal

•

carbon monoxide (92 ppb emitted by natural gas compared to
approximately 450 ppb for oil or coal)

•

sulfur dioxide (1 ppb for natural gas versus 1,122 ppb for oil
and 2,591 ppb for coal)

•

almost no nitrogen oxides from natural gas compared to burning other fossil fuels

•

almost no particulate matter from natural gas, unlike other
fossil fuels252

during the initial promulgation of the rule instead of using the recent data available during
the three years of the compliance period arguing that the current data may be not available
to EPA during the time for rule finalization. See Comments of Calpine Corporation, Exelon
Corporation, And Public Service Enterprise Group, Inc. on U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s Proposed Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate
Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- And Oil- Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units
(December 1, 2015) (on file with EPA Docket), https://www.regulations.gov/content
Streamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20549&attachmentNumber=1&disposition
=attachment&contentType=pdf. (“Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized that only a
‘preliminary estimate’ of cost would be available to the Agency at the time the listing
decision is made. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711.”).
250
See Ferrey, supra note 73 (stating that coal-fired emissions exceed emissions for natural
gas-fired power facilities).
251
Krauss, supra note 8; Jaber & Horner, supra note 239.
252
Ferrey, supra note 62, at 595-596.
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Due to larger economic factors unrelated to, and predating, the MATS
rule, gas and coal were exchanging their positions of fuel dominance. From
2006 to 2012, prior to impact of either MATS and the Clean Power Plan, gas
use increased 25%, moving from providing 20% of America’s electricity to
nearly 25%, with coal declining from more than half the source for power a
few years before to 36% in 2012.253 Coal-fired generation has decreased to
now approaching ever closer to 30% of power production.254 These changing
roles have continued: During the first half of 2016, natural gas supplied 36
percent of U.S. electricity generation, while coal supplied 31 percent.255 The
respective shares of different sources of U.S. electricity are shown in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2:

253

Gas Works: Shale Gas is giving a big boost to America’s Economy, THE ECONOMIST (July
14, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21558459.
254
Stephen Lacey, U.S. Coal Generation Drops 19 Percent In One Year, Leaving Coal
with 36 Percent Share of Electricity, T HINK P ROGRESS (May 14, 2012), https://thinkpro
gress.org/u-s-coal-generation-drops-19-percent-in-one-year-leaving-coal-with-36-percent
-share-of-electricity-4b06091d4cde/
255
Marie Cusick, Coal may outpace natural gas in electric power generation this winter,
STATE IMPACT (Nov. 23, 2006), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2016/11/23/coalmay-outpace-natural-gas-in-electric-power-generation-this-winter/.
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B. Counting Outside the Section 112 Lines: The Weight, if any, of
Non-Hazardous Pollutants
The key question raised in Michigan is whether it is legitimate in comparing costs and benefits of a particalar regulation to count co-benefits from
reduction of pollutants that are not regulated by the particular rule. The Supreme
Court has yet to answer. Stated in the dimension of technology, if rather than try
to order through energy regulation that coal plant operation be diminished, one
does so indirectly through environmental regulation of the emissions from coalfired facilities, can the ‘benefit’ side of the ledger count items that are not regulated on the cost side of the ledger? And beyond the issue of counting co-benefits,
can one assume credit to a regulation for changes in technology, fuels, and
emissions being driven by economic forces rather than by regulation?
In a defensive posture, EPA, however, in the Michigan case claimed it
did not consider co-benefits at all, but it was the substantial risks associated with
the emission of mercury and HAPs from electric generation unit power facilities
that supported EPA’s findings of the reasonableness of the EPA’s preferred approach.256 It also argued that co-benefits should be counted in the quantitative benefits.257 In support of why the co-benefits should be considered, EPA argued that:
Because the co-benefits are a direct consequence of actions to
reduce HAP emissions, are consistent with economic guidance
documents, and are consistent with statutory requirements in
CAA [Clean Air Act] Section 112(n)(1)(A), it would be unreasonable for the EPA to ignore co-benefits in the comparison of
monetized benefits to monetized costs for MATS.258
256

Supplemental Finding, supra note 211, at 47-50. MIT Institute for Data, System and Society
predicted, based on the study to estimate the benefits of U.S. (MATS) and global (United Nations
Minamata Convention) mercury policy for U.S. populations, including consumers of self-caught
freshwater fish and consumers of commercial marine and estuarine fish in the U.S. market that
“compared to a scenario without additional mercury and air pollution controls, MATS could yield
cumulative lifetime benefits for individuals affected by 2050 of $147 billion (2005 USD,
discounted at 3%), and cumulative economy-wide benefits realized by 2050 of $43 billion (2005
USD, discounted at 3%). Sensitivity scenarios addressing uncertainties and variability in mercury
chemistry, and ecosystem and human responses, led to a range of $625 million to $225 billion in
lifetime benefits, and $4.1 million to $66.2 billion in economy-wide benefits.” See Letter from
Amanda Giang et al., Institute for Data, Systems, and Society, MIT, to Dr. Nick Hutson, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStream
er?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20544&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attach
ment&contentType=pdf (providing researchers’ comments on EPA’s coal and oil regulations).
257
Id.
258
Id.
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EPA submitted that any “proper and complete” benefit analysis must
factor in all the pollution reduction of any kind when regulating under section
112(d) of the Clean Air Act which controls power plant hazardous emissions.259 EPA submitted that the inclusion of indirect benefits is consistent with
Executive Orders and guidance of OMB.260 Many stakeholder commenters to
the proposed and remanded regulation disagreed.
The Texas Commission on Environment Quality (TCEQ) objected to
counting co-benefits from particulate matter and sulfur dioxide emission
reductions because they are covered under a different section of the Clean Air
Act than the section involved with the MATS rule, and are not listed under the
relevant section 112(b) of the Act as HAPs.261 Opponents of the EPA rule
highlighed the purpose of section 112 of the Act “to achieve prompt, permanent, and ongoing reductions in HAP emissions from stationary sources.”262
They argued that it is only “logical” to consider only benefits of HAP emission
reduction while considering cost incurred for HAP emission reduction.263
One concern expressed was the weight that co-benefits play in the total
calculation. Analysis of thirty-seven peer-reviewed studies of air quality cobenefits indicates that the co-benefits play a smaller role in the calculation of
stringent pollution emission standards.264 Considering co-benefits reduces “the
259

See Citizens for Pennsylvania, supra note 249 (providing commentary on EPA coal and
oil regulations).
260
Supplemental Finding, supra note 211. See, e.g., Memorandum from George P. Shulz,
Director, Office of Management and Budget, for the Heads of Departments and Agencies:
Agency regulations, standards, and guidelines pertaining to environmental quality, consumer
protection, and occupational and public health and safety (Oct. 5, 1971), http://www.thecre.
com/ombpapers/QualityofLife1.htm (establishing a procedure that included including costs and
benefits on proposals in order to improve the interagency coordination); Exec. Order No. 12044,
43 C.F.R. 12661 (Mar. 24, 1978) (executive order by Jimmy Carter directing each Executive
Agency to adopt procedures to improve existing and future regulations); Exec. Order No. 12291,
46 C.F.R. 13193 (Feb. 17, 1981) (executive order by Ronald Reagan stating that regulations
should only be enacted if the potential benefits to society outweigh the potential costs to society);
Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 C.F.R. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (executive order by Bill Clinton urging
agencies to weigh the costs and benefits of policy alternatives).
261
Comments of Texas Commission, supra note 239.
262
Id.
263
Id.
264
See C. Boyden Gray, EPA’s Use of Co-Benefits, 16 Engage: J. Federalist Soc'y Prac.
Groups 31 (2015) (expressing concern that the vast majority of co-benefits derive from a
questionable metric that estimates reductions of premature mortality associated with policy
changes); Nemet et al., Implications of incorporating air-quality co-benefits into climate
change policymaking, 5 Environ. Res. Lett (2010) (finding that “full inclusion of co-benefits
depends on—rather than substitutes for—better valuation of climate damages”).
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societal cost of climate policy,” or interpreted from the alternative perspective,
justifies rigorous climate change regulations “by increasing the avoided societal damages” which are counted as ‘benefits.’265 Even when damages are the
main driving force behind any environmental policy regulations, such damages
are not generally included in the assessment due to distrust over the reliability
of environmental impact studies.266 In the cases when the co-benefits are
greatly appreciated as substantial, valuation of earlier loss of life becomes
difficult and could make a significant difference in the total benefits counted,
with or without co-benefits.267
The tail wags the dog with the MATS regulations remanded by the
Supreme Court: Reduction of particulate matter, itself not a toxic pollutant,
occurring coincidently through the asumed closure of coal-fired plants which
could not cost-effectively meet the MATS rule, due to emission regulation only
of mercury, were forecast to reduce the premature mortality from particulate
matter in the air by about 98%, becoming the greatest monetized ‘benefit’ in
the MATS benefit protocol.268 This co-benefit value becomes significant based
265

Id.
See WILLIE SOON, A SCIENTIFIC CRITIQUE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S
“NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS [NESHAP] FROM
COAL- AND OIL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM GENERATING UNITS AND STANDARDS OF
PERFORMANCE FOR FOSSIL-FUEL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITY, INDUSTRIAL-COMMERCIAL
INSTITUTIONAL, AND SMALL INDUSTRIAL-COMMERCIAL INSTITUTIONAL STEAM GENERATING
UNITS (2011) (“The EPA proposal neglects key scientific knowledge and many peerreviewed papers that suggest there is no straightforward connection between mercury (Hg)
emissions from power plants or other man-made sources to the mercury level in fish. There
is little doubt that levels of the biologically active form of mercury, methyl-mercury (MeHg)
that are ultimately accumulating in fish tissue depends primarily upon environmental and
ecosystem factors such as amounts of sulfate, sunlight and organic matter, pH level, water
temperature, and amounts of bacteria or zooplankton. MeHg levels in fish do not depend
simply on the amount of elemental Hg available for conversion. This is why a distinguished
group of mercury science experts 7 concluded that a simple change in bacterial activity alone
could cause an increase in fish mercury concentrations, even as atmospheric deposition
[from industrial mercury emission sources] decreases.’”).
267
Id.
268
Gray, supra note 264, at 31. See also Ambient (outdoor) air quality and health, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 2016), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs313/en/ (“A 2013
assessment by WHO’s International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) concluded that
outdoor air pollution is carcinogenic to humans, with the particulate matter component of air
pollution most closely associated with increased cancer incidence, especially cancer of the
lung. An association also has been observed between outdoor air pollution and increase in
cancer of the urinary tract/bladder. Ambient (outdoor air pollution) in both cities and rural
areas was estimated to cause 3.7 million premature deaths worldwide per year in 2012; this
mortality is due to exposure to small particulate matter of 10 microns or less in diameter
(PM10), which cause cardiovascular and respiratory disease, and cancers.”).
266
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on the estimated “value per statistical life” assumed to be saved by less particulate matter emissions to the ambient air, although it was noted by
commenters that the the EPA-assigned value disregards the age of the person,
inter alia the earning capacity of the individual, and the person’s potential
contribution to society.269
Commenters noted that such a method of measuring co-benefits in
monetary value was questionable since “significant uncertainty remains”
regarding “the reduction of premature deaths associated with a reduction in
particulate matter and … the monetary value of reducing mortality risk.”270
The existing particulate matter standards are otherwise already established by
another section of the Clean Air Act to already protect human health with “an
adequate margin of safety.”271 Of note, the Supreme Court, in another matter,
held that different sections of the Clean Air Act are distinct and separate, such
that EPA can adopt fundamentally different interpretations of identical
Congressional language used in both sections.272
Historic perspective and practice: Notwithstanding stakeholder
criticisms of the MATS rule methodology, EPA’s use of co-benefits in the
‘benefits’ calculation has been the EPA practice in the past.273 However, the
269

Gray, supra note 264.
Id.
271
42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409(b)(1).
272
Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007) (providing that the
EPA can define “modification” differently in sections 110 and 111 of the Clean Air Act).
273
Joint Statement by Inst. for Policy Integrity at NYU Law School to EPA (Jan. 15, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-205
38&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf. “Moreover, EPA—
under presidents of both parties and across four decades—has consistently taken indirect
benefits into account when evaluating Clean Air Act regulations. For example, when
proposing to develop New Source Performance Standards for municipal waste combustors,
EPA under President Reagan explained that it intended to ‘consider the full spectrum of the
potential impacts of regulation,’ including ‘indirect benefits accruing from concomitant
reductions in other regulated pollutants.’ Similarly, in proposing performance standards for
landfill gases, EPA under President George H.W. Bush justified the regulation partly by
reference to ‘the ancillary benefit of reducing global loadings of methane.’ EPA under
President Clinton analyzed the indirect benefits of reducing co-pollutants like volatile
organic compounds, particulate matter, and carbon monoxide from emissions standards
addressing hazardous pollutants from pulp and paper producers. In promulgating a rule on
mobile source air toxics, EPA under President George W. Bush noted, ‘Although ozone and
[particulate matter] are considered criteria pollutants rather than “air toxics,” reductions in
ozone and [particulate matter] are nevertheless important co-benefits of this proposal.’
Finally, EPA under President Obama considered the indirect benefits from reducing carbon
monoxide, volatile organic compounds, and nitrogen oxides in its analysis of regulating
hazardous air pollutants from combustion engines.” (citing 52 Fed. Reg. 25,399, 25,406 (July
7, 1987); 56 Fed. Reg. 24,468, 24,469 (May 30, 1991); 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504, 18,585–86 (Apr.
270
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influence of such co-benefits has never been so profound in influencing the
ultimate balance and outcome of the cost-benefit calculation for recent
regulations: The immense cost in the billions of dollar for the emission control
programs for greenhouse gas reduction under the Clean Power Plan274 and
MATS swamp by one-thousand times the direct ‘benefit’ from the targetted
emission controlled, which is valued at less than six million dollars.
Benefits only exceed costs by counting co-benefits from the reduced
amounts of other chemicals that are linked to mortality incidences. Particulate
matter is not a hazardous chemical and is a criteria pollutant separately
controlled to an “adequate margin of safety”275 under a different section of the
Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards, under which it is not
an objective to minimize emissions of criteria pollutants.276 As EPA noted in
its MATS RIA:
NAAQS are not set at a level of zero risks. Instead, the NAAQS
reflect the level determined by the Administrator to be
protective of public health within an adequate margin of safety,
taking into consideration effects on susceptible populations.
While benefits occurring below the standard may be less certain
than those occurring above the standard, EPA considers them
to be legitimate components of the total benefits estimate.277
The NAAQS for criteria pollutants, like NOx, already are set at supposedly safe levels, based on the science. The EPA reevaluates the NAAQS every
five years set according to “air quality criteria [that] shall accurately reflect the
latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence
of such pollutant in ambient air, in varying quantities.”278 Separately, EPA,
15, 1998); 72 Fed. Reg. 8428, 8430 (Feb. 26, 2007); 75 Fed. Reg. 51,570, 51,578 (Aug. 20,
2010)).
274
See Gray, supra note 264.
275
The EPA must establish NAAQS for pollutants; pursuant to §109(b) of the Clean Air Act,
those standards must be “requisite to protect public health” with “an adequate margin of
safety.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409(b)(1).
276
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409(b)(1) (Statutes providing air quality criteria and control
techniques).
277
U.S. EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, EPA452/R-11-011 (Dec. 2011), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/matsriafinal.pdf.
278
Susan E. Dudley, Supp. Finding that it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous
Air Pollution from Coal and Oil-Fired Elec. Utility Steam Generating Units (Jan. 11, 2016), https://
www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20527&attac
hmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (citing Clean Air Act §108(a)(2).
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based on the guidance of its science advisory panel, proposed revisions of the
NAAQS for particulate matter to be reduced for all Air Quality Control Regions in the country to 12 µg/m3 from the prior standard of 15 µg/m3 to
preserve an adequate margin of safety. This is a 20% tightening of the PM
emissions standard. In 2013, the EPA “tightened the annual, health-based
national ambient air quality standard for fine particles, which had been set at
15 micrograms per cubic meter.”279 The EPA retained its daily PM2.5 standard
of 35 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3) set in 2006.280
C. The ‘New Math’ of ‘Co-Benefits’
The states, stakeholders, and the scientific community are split on the
inclusion or non-inclusion of incidental co-benefits in any cost-benefit calculation or algorithm for federal environmental regulations. With regard to
another Obama Administration regulation, the Clean Power Plan also counts a
very large amount of co-benefits from reduction of other than its expressly and
solely targeted CO2, and counts many international climate benefits in proportion
to relatively limited domestic climate benefits, evaluated against its substantial
future domestic compliance costs.281
Former EPA Administrator Mike Leavitt stated "cleaning the air gets
more difficult as the maximum benefits from existing rules are achieved and
the low-hanging fruit is gone.”282 Any new regulations would be costlier to
implement, and any cost-benefit justification of the rule requiring high cost of
implementation with very little direct benefit will require the inclusion of air
quality co-benefits to make the rule cost-effective. When the co-benefits counted
are greater than the benefits, as with each of the unilateraly promulgated EPA
“The Supreme Court has confirmed EPA’s interpretation that this statutory language precludes
consideration of any impacts other than direct health effects from exposure to the pollutant.” Id.
at 4 n.8.
279
Patrick Ambrosio, 14 Areas Don’t Meet Air Quality Standard for Fine Particulates, EPA
Says in Proposal, 45 ENV’T REP. 2517 (BNA) (Aug. 28, 2014). EPA revised the annual
primary PM2.5 NAAQS to 12 µg/m3 from the previous level of 15 µg/m3 on Dec 14, 2012.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REVISED AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR
PARTICLE POLLUTION AND UPDATES TO THE AIR QUALITY INDEX (AQI) 1 (2012).
http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/particlepollution/2012/decfsstandards.pdf.
280
Id.
281
See Andrew M. Grossman, Michigan v. EPA: A Mandate for Agencies to Consider Costs,
2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 281, 306–07 (2015) (providing scholarly commentary on Michigan case).
282
Cynthia Bergman, 2003 Status Report Shows U.S. Air Cleanest Since 1970, EPA (Sep. 9,
2004), https://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/d13d7cbd4048f16e85256f1700536aaf?
OpenDocument.
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Clean Power Plan and MATS rules, the co-benefits are no longer incidental
mathematically. The co-benefits change the results from costs that far exceed
the direct benefits, to thereafter flip the outcome when all incidental co-benefits
plus direct benefits exceed costs. Co-benefits are a game changer for the
environment and climate policy.
EPA’s position regarding the MATS rule is:283
•

the statutory language of section 112(n) of the Clean Air Act
on hazardous pollutants does not explicitly prohibit consideration of co-benefits;

•

the ruling of the Supreme Court in Michigan does not explicitly
prohibit particulate matter and sulfur dioxide co-benefits
inclusion in calculations of the net benefits of hazardous
substance regulation; and

•

recognition of “collateral benefit of controlling criteria pollutants” in the legislative history of Clean Air Act section
112(d)(2) is Congress’s implicit indirect permission to include
such ancillary co-benefits in a cost-benefit calculation.

Attorney-Generals from fifteen states supported EPA’s inclusion of cobenefits from pollutants not controlled under section 112 of the Act.284 EPA in
its rule-specific Regulatory Impact Analysis for MATS mentions the steps it
has taken to avoid double-counting of benefits.285 EPA, denying the allegation
of double-counting levelled against it, stated:
283

See 135 S.Ct. at 2711 (“Even if the Agency could have considered ancillary benefits when
deciding whether it is appropriate and necessary – a point we need not address – it plainly
did not so here.”); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (regulating hazardous air pollutants);
Supplemental Finding that it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air
Pollutants from Coal-and Oil-fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, page 98-99
(citing S. Rep. No. 101-228, 101st Cong. 1st sess. at 172).
284
See Joint Statement by Fifteen State Attorney Generals to EPA (Jan. 15, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-205
51&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (providing statement from Attorney Generals to EPA).
285
See also U.S. EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Mercury and Air Toxics
Standards, EPA-452/R-11-011 (Dec. 2011), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/mats
riafinal.pdf., at page 110 (“To avoid double-counting benefits from reductions in myocardial
infarctions when applying the impact function for cardiovascular hospital admissions, we first
adjusted the baseline cardiovascular hospital admissions to remove admissions for myocardial
infarctions.”). “To prevent double-counting, we focused the estimation on asthma exacerbations
occurring in children and excluded adults from the calculation.” Id. at 113.
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[s]tandard practice for its rules is to estimate, to the extent data
and time allow, all benefits of the emissions reductions
achieved by a rule beyond control requirements for other rules.
If this rule was duplicative with other rules, then there would
be no additional costs or benefits attributable to this rule.286
EPA claimed that in its MATS analysis it includes “rules such as CrossState Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) in the ‘baseline’ in estimating the benefits
and costs of rules like MATS.”287 EPA claimed that any emission reduction as
a result of MATS are additional reductions and hence not counted twice;
likewise benefits of particulate matter reduction per the MATS rule are not
counted with the estimated benefits of the NAAQS RIA.288 So, alleged doublecounting is not being claimed for the MATS rule analysis, but any doublecounting is shifted by EPA to the revised NAAQS promulgation, which was
separately promulgated and not under challenge in the Michigan matter. EPA,
in its revised NAAQS RIA, stated that:
286

EPA, Supplemental Finding that it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous
Air Pollutants from Coal-and Oil-fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, at 107
(citing U.S. EPA. 2011. EPA’s Responses to Public Comments on EPA’s National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units. December. Volume 2 of 2. Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-023420126). The EPA counts the benefits from the reductions of pollutants beyond the floor-level
to avoid any double-counting. Id. However, the opponents of the MATS Rule based on
double-counting argued that when the industry has already achieved the standards set by the
particular Clean Air Act rule, which again are set by EPA for maximum benefit with the
available technology, counting benefits from further reduction beyond floor-level is
unreliable and such benefits are thus double-counting. Id. EPA clarified further that “PM2.5
health benefits expected from MATS are not double-counted with benefits estimated in the
NAAQS RIAs . . . because the NAAQS are not set at a level of zero risk and the science fully
supports quantifying benefits below the NAAQS, the EPA considers them to be legitimate
components of the total benefit estimate.” Id. Subsequently, EPA proposed the updated
NAAQS standards and included MATS Rule as baseline to avoid any double-counting. Id.
287
Susan E. Dudley, Supp. Finding that it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate
Hazardous Air Pollution from Coal and Oil-Fired Elec. Utility Steam Generating Units (Jan.
11, 2016), at 107. See also Joint Statement, Inst. for Policy Integrity, NYU Law School (Jan.
15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009
-0234-20538&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (providing
statement from NYU Law’s Institute for Policy Integrity regarding regulation of coal and oil
fired power plants).
288
EPA, Supplemental Finding that it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air
Pollutants from Coal-and Oil-fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, supra note 286. See
also Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Particulate Matter (February 28, 2013), http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Do
ckey=P100G5UO.pdf (providing analysis for final revision of particulate matter NAAQs).
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One important distinction between the total public health burden
estimated for 2005 air pollution levels and the estimated benefits
in this RIA is that ambient levels of PM2.5 will have improved
substantially by 2020, due to major emissions reductions resulting from implementation of Federal regulations. For example, we
estimate that SO2 emissions (an important PM2.5 precursor) in the
United States would fall from 14 million tons in 2005 to less than
5 million tons by 2020 (a reduction of 66%). For this reason,
States will only need to achieve small air quality improvements
to reach the proposed PM standards. As shown in the recent RIA
for MATS (U.S. EPA, 2011b), implementing other Federal and
State air quality actions will address a substantial fraction of the
total public health burden of PM2.5 and ozone air pollution.289
Some professors supported EPA’s use of co-benefits because more
credible evidence now exists that exposure to methylmercury has adverse
impacts on the cardiovascular health, and it is “challenging to isolate the neurodevelopmental and cardiovascular impacts of methylmercury exposure from
seafood consumption because seafood also contains long-chained fatty acids . . .
serves to mask those deleterious impacts.”290 However, this is more a critique of
the difficulty of assessing the benefits of health, than it is a principled concept of
how to structure the cost-benefit algorithm. Another professor stated that “EPA
correctly avoids double-counting those benefits here” because it only counts
MATS rule PM2.5 reductions “well below the levels it has already determined
are ‘protective of public health with an adequate margin of safety.’”291 This last
289

Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Particulate Matter, http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100G5U
O.pdf.
290
Joint Statement by Elsie M. Sunderland, Charles T. Driscoll, Jr., James K. Hammitt,
Philippe Grandjean, John S. Evans, Joel D. Blum, Celia Y. Chen, David C. Evers, Daniel
A. Jaffe, Robert P. Mason, and the Emmett Environmental Law & Policy Clinic to EPA
(Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OA
R-2009-0234-20547&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf
(citing K.R. Mahaffey, et al., Balancing the benefits of n-3 polyunsaturated fatty acids
and risks of methylmercury exposure from fish consumption, Nutrition Revs., 69(9): 493508 (2011); E. Oken, et al., Maternal fish intake during pregnancy, blood mercury levels
and child cognition at Age 3 years in a US Cohort, AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY. 167(10): 11711181 (2008)).
291
Dudley, supra note 115; see also MATS RIA Final, at page 224 (“Approximately 11%
of the avoided premature deaths occur at or above an annual mean PM 2.5 level of 10 µg/m3
(the LML of the Laden et al. 2006 study), and about 73% occur at or above an annual mean
PM2.5 level of 7.5 µg/m3 (the LML of the Pope et. Al. 2002 study). As we model avoided
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statement, however, would seem to invite critique of the true value of separate
pollutant reductions already necessary and implemented through the NAAQS to
protect human health.
EPA’s allocation of co-benefits to prior different rules is not accepted
by many commenters. The Chief Environmental Officer of the Southern
Company commented that EPA contradicts its own position taken for NAAQS
review by still counting the benefits of further reduced particulate matter, a
criteria pollutant, under HAP hazardous emission control.292 It was asserted
that this co-benefits calculation clouded EPA’s cost-benefit analysis and
justification for the MATS rule’s “appropriate and necessary” findings, by
double-counting the benefits of particulate matter and sulfur dioxide which are
pollutants covered only under National Ambient Air Quality Standards of the
Clean Air Act.293
Other states and commenters were critical of the EPA protocol to
include co-benefits that are not regulated by the MATS regulation. Opponents
of the EPA’s consideration of co-benefits from criteria air pollutants not within
mercury and HAP emission control, argued that such practice is contrary to
Congress’s intention. Congress intended EPA to consider hazardous HAP cobenefits but did not allow EPA to consider non-hazardous criteria pollutant cobenefits.294 On the discretional of EPA to count co-benefits, the Director of the
Ohio EPA, in comments to US EPA, stated:
premature deaths among populations exposed to levels of PM2.5 that are successively lower
than the LML of each study our confidence in the results diminishes. The International
Society for Environmental Epidemiology (ISEE) responding to the EPA’s invitation for
comments on NAAQS standards update, recommends to reduce annual PM2.5 to the level
of 10 µg/m3 as recommended by WHO’s assessment that “adverse effects on health cannot
be entirely ruled out below [that] level[].” WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO AIR
QUALITY GUIDELINES FOR PARTICULATE MATTER, OZONE, NITROGEN DIOXIDE AND
SULFUR DIOXIDE 10 (2005) [hereinafter WHO AIR QUALITY]; see also MATS RIA Final,
Figure 5-15.
292
See Comments of Southern Company to the EPA (Jan. 15, 2016) https://www.regulations.
gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20543&attachmentNumber=2&
disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (providing a statement from Southern Company
supporting regulation of pollutants from coal and oil power plants).
293
See Gray, supra note 264 (“PM2.5 and Ozone are both already directly regulated by EPA’s
NAAQS to a level ‘requisite to protect the public health’ with ‘an adequate margin of safety.’
Thus, whenever EPA counts PM2.5 or Ozone reductions in its cost-benefit analysis for other rules,
it is double-counting reductions already mandated by NAAQS.”).
294
Id. (“The Agency attempts to justify its reliance on PM co-benefits by pointing to the HAP cobenefits related to the Acid Rain Program and other CAA programs that were intended to reduce
criteria pollutant emissions. According to the EPA, if Congress approved of HAP co-benefits
occurring as a result of criteria pollutant regulation, it is reasonable to assume Congress wanted
the Agency to account for criteria pollutant co-benefits in the HAPs context. But, this rationale

Vol. 3:2]

Phantom Regulation

161

“When U.S. EPA promulgates a revised National Ambient Air
Quality Standard (NAAQS) it uses the amount of air quality
improvement as a measure to determine benefits. If a facility
installs controls to meet the NAAQS and also complies with the
Utility MATS, plus Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR),
U.S. EPA should not double or even triple count those reductions
as part of each rulemaking. The health benefit that U.S. EPA
states is occurring can only occur once, not be recounted multiple
times under separate U.S. EPA rulemakings.” 295
Similar arguments were expressed by others opposing the MATS rule
based on EPA’s alleged double-counting of benefits.296 EPA’s reliance on
counting the benefits from massive criteria pollutant reductions that were
reverses Congress’ intent by ignoring that Congress clearly directed the EPA to account for HAP
co-benefits that would result from regulation under other aspects of the CAA. As a result,
Congress’ recognition of the HAP co-benefits actually undercut’s the EPA’s reliance on criteria
pollutant co-benefits to support regulation of HAPs. The EPA’s position would disregard the very
limitation of §112(n)(1)(a) – which does not permit the Agency to regulate HAP emissions unless
it deems it “appropriate and necessary” after it has already regulated criteria pollutant emissions
from EGUs. By seeking to justify regulation of HAP emissions through further reduction of
criteria pollutants beyond that required by other CAA programs, the EPA essentially circumvents
the limitations of §112(n)(1)(a).”)). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (“The Administrator shall
perform a study of the hazards to public health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of
emissions by electric utility steam generating units of pollutants listed under subsection (b) after
imposition of the requirements of this Act. The Administrator shall report the results of this study
to the Congress within 3 years after the date of the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990. The Administrator shall develop and describe in the Administrator’s report to Congress
alternative control strategies for emissions which may warrant regulation under this section. The
Administrator shall regulate electric utility steam generating units under this section, if the
Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary after considering the results of
the study required by this subparagraph.”).
295
Comment by Ohio Env. Protection Agency to EPA (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.re
gulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20560&attachment
Number=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
296
See Comment by Counsel for Utility Air Group to EPA (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.regu
lations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20557&attachment
Number=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (“In order for there to be co-benefits
from PM2.5 to attribute to the Proposed Rule, the Proposed Rule must require more
reductions of primary PM2.5 and PM2.5 precursors (e.g., SO2 and NOx) than would
otherwise occur under other existing regulations, including the current National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for PM2.5. To include any co-benefits from reductions that
will occur anyway as a result of the current PM2.5 NAAQS in this rule would be to doublecount those benefits – first as the direct benefits that were counted to justify the PM2.5
NAAQS in that rule’s 2006 RIA (EPA, 2006), and then again as co-benefits to justify this
Proposed Rule.”).
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forecast to occur due to implementation of other NAAQS regulations unrelated
to MATS to justify MATS and CSAPR, could be viewed, or not viewed, as
double or triple-counting of benefits.297
The Supreme Court deferred any comment on the math or algorithm
that the EPA could use as its methodology to consider costs. Since EPA admitted that it had not considered cost, and did not present to the Court a
methodology for cost consideration, by its own admission, the Supreme Court
awaited the EPA to sustain this regulatory burden before evaluating or opining
on specific elements to be chosen by EPA. It remains an open question whether
environmental changes that are not the subject of an agency rule can be counted
as incidental co-benefits of implementing the rule and imposing the rule’s
costs. Until Michigan, this was an academic exercise. Post Michigan, this
calculation determines the regulatory future of U.S. law.
VI. SQUARING THE REGULATORY CIRCLE
A. Legal Precedent
In the absence of congressional clarity, judicial decisions and precedent
resolve statutory ambiguity and conflicts in interpretation. The author’s search
for adjudicated EPA cases sanctioning double-counting of benefits produced no
precedent. Nor did a search for precedential rules for resoving conflict between
existing federal environmental and energy law, which also yielded no decisions
or statutory directives.298 These are now matters of unresolved first impression.
Reverting back to the underlying statute, under the Clean Air Act, there
is a specified division of state and federal authority where states have the “firstimplementer role,”299 while EPA “is relegated . . . to a secondary role.”300
However, within this overlapping jurisdictional envelope, there is no federal
case law, nor any FERC, Department of Energy, or EPA rules, which resolve
direct conflicts between mandating and counting environmental benefits from
restraining power plant operation and commands of other agencies to operate
297

See Comment by National Mining Association to EPA (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.reg
ulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-20531&attachment
Number=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (providing the statement by National
Mining Association urging EPA to rescind and re-propose its “appropriate and necessary” finding for electric generating units).
298
See Ferrey, supra note 48 (proving that author could not find precedent for EPA cases
sanctioning double-counting).
299
EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 696 F.3d at 31 (quoting Train v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975)) (emphasis omitted).
300
Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975).

Vol. 3:2]

Phantom Regulation

163

fossil fuel-fired power generation units.301 The closest precedent is provocative
Supreme Court dicta from four decades ago in Union Electric,302 that an owner
of a fossil fuel-fired power generation facility can always “shut down its plant
and curtail electric service” to meet any imposed environmental requirements.
Congressional testimony in 2014 by FERC Commissioner Clark characterized
the unresolved conflict between proposed environmental regulation to assist
climate goals and the countervailing pressure to protect power system
operating reliability and resiliency as a looming “jurisdictional train wreck.”303
As close as the court has ventured to resolve environmental and energy
conflicts, involved not clean air, but the Clean Water Act. In its 2009 Riverkeeper decision,304 the Supreme Court held that Congress, pursuant to Clean
Water Act section 316(b), did not categorically forbid EPA from comparing
costs to benefits when determining what is the best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impacts of power plant cooling water
intake structures.305 EPA was left the authority to decide to engage or not in
such analysis.306 Any Presidential administration could decide how or if to
exercise this discretion.
Pursuant to the key Court decision in Michigan v. EPA, Section 112(n)
of the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to regulate hazardous air pollutants
from power plants only if it concludes that such regulation is “appropriate and
necessary.”307 In reaching its conclusion to regulate, EPA stated that cost was
irrelevant, which the Supreme Court found was not reasonable agency
interpretation regarding what was “appropriate and necessary.”308 The narrow
majority in Michigan stated that “no regulation is ‘appropriate’ if it does
significantly more harm than good.”309 Quoting Justice Breyer’s concurring
opinion in Riverkeeper, the majority further reasoned that:
301

See Ferrey, supra note 48 (supporting proposition that author could not find case law or
rules resolving conflicts in counting environmental benefits).
302
See generally Union Elec. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) (holding that an owner
of fossil fuel power facility can shut down its plant to meet environmental requirements).
303
Lynn Garner, FERC Comm’rs Split on Party Lines Over EPA’s Carbon Rule for Power
Plants, BLOOMBERG (July 29, 2014), http://info.bna.com/climate/summary_news.aspx?ID
=274977.
304
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208 (2009). The Court did not require EPA to
employ cost-benefit analysis, however EPA must provide a reasoned explanation if it should
choose to regulate in a way that would do more harm than good, or provide a reasoned
explanation why the agency is indifferent to that outcome. Id. at 236.
305
Id.
306
Id.
307
See 42 U.S.C. 7412(n) (regulating hazardous air pollutants).
308
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2699.
309
Id.
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Agencies have long treated cost as a centrally relevant factor
when deciding whether to regulate. Consideration of cost reflects
the understanding that reasonable regulation ordinarily requires
paying attention to the advantages and the disadvantages of
agency decisions. It also reflects the reality that “too much
wasteful expenditure devoted to one problem may well mean
considerably fewer resources available to deal effectively with
other (perhaps more serious) problems.” Against the backdrop of
this established administrative practice, it is unreasonable to read
an instruction to an administrative agency to determine whether
“regulation is appropriate and necessary” as an invitation to
ignore cost.310
EPA admitted that the overwhelming majority of its total estimated
MATS benefits – 99.9% – are due to reduction of particulate matter and sulfur
dioxide, which as criteria pollutants, are not regulated by the MATS rule,
which only regulates mercury and air toxics as hazardous pollutants.311 Criteria
pollutants, under different parts of the Act, already are subject to “stringent”
regulations for NAAQS and also are further reduced by EPA’s separate
CSAPR rule.312 “Incidental” co-benefits have both a qualitative and quantitative element. Under the MATS regulation, the indirect incidental co-benefits
are not incidiental in quantitative amount—they are totally responsible, alone,
for changing the cost-benefit calculation to make total benefits exceed cost and
thereby quantitatively justify regulation.313 Ninety-nine and nine-tenth percent
of the total benefits from these MATS Clean Air Act regulations are from
estimated reduced mortality due to a “co-benefit” reduction in particulate
matter criteria pollutants.314
The question still remaining to be resolved by the Court is: Can the “cobenefits” tail wag the direct benefit regulatory dog? EME Homer established
the permissibility of cost considerations under an admittedly ambiguous
different provision of the Clean Air Act.315 Where PM2.5 criteria pollution
already regulated elsewhere in the Act must be reduced by an explicit “adequate margin of safety” for human health below its NAAQS standards, in the cost
310

Id.
Id.
312
Id.
313
See Krauss, supra note 8; Jaber & Horner, supra note 239 (providing that the indirect criteria
pollutant co-benefits, unregulated by MATS, are 99.9% of total benefits counted by EPA, while
the directly MATS-regulated CO2 benefits are 0.1% of total benefits counted by EPA).
314
See id.
315
Morss & Wooley, THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 42 at 4.
311
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algorithm can an agency also count additional reductions in PM2.5 that are not
regulated by the challenged MATS rule?316 This is still a matter yet to be
determined by the Court.
B. The Next Step
This is a matter of first impression for the Court: There are no precedent
on this issue of the regulatory operands, nor, amazingly, on the more broad
question of using environmental mechanisms to influence energy generator
operation.317 So where does this leave regulatory cost and the law? The Michigan Supreme Court decision did not dimish Chevron deference for the EPA
to make the initial choice of the cost analysis methodology and algorithm for
assessing costs.318 However once selected and applied by the agency, its
method-ology still can be reviewed by the Supreme Court under the “hardlook” doctrine established in Overton Park v. Volpe.319 In Overton Park,
Justice Marshall, also speaking for a unanimous Court, reversed the agency
reading of the statute, to discourage adding any consideration of costs or
benefits.320 However, Overton Park did not involve the Clean Air Act or EPA,
and instead involved the confiscation by the Department of Transportation of
park property and other land to build a highway.321
The Clean Air Act provides no guidance as to cost thresholds or how
costs and benefits should be calculated. The Act’s Section 112 does not require
that hazardous air pollutant emission control costs can be compared with
benefits of reduced mercury hazardous air pollutants only. The Michigan Court
noted that costs include the up-front cost of implementation, but also include
316

See Dudley, supra note 112 (providing background leading author to ask hypothetical
question). See also MATS RIA Final, at page 224 (“Approximately 11% of the avoided
premature deaths occur at or above an annual mean PM2.5 level of 10 µg/m3 (the LML of the
Laden et al. 2006 study), and about 73% occur at or above an annual mean PM2.5 level of 7.5
µg/m3 (the LML of the Pope et. Al. 2002 study). The International Society for Environmental
Epidemiology (ISEE) responding to the EPA’s invitation for comments on NAAQS
standard’s update, recommends reducing annual PM2.5 to the level of 10 µg/m3 as
recommended by WHO’s assessment that “adverse effects on health cannot be entirely ruled
out even below that level.” WHO AIR QUALITY supra note 291; see also MATS RIA Final,
Figure 5-15 (accounting for additional benefits).
317
See Ferrey, supra note 48 (establishing that author could not find precedent).
318
See Michigan 135 S. Ct. 2699 (supporting that court did not diminish Chevron deference).
319
See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (establishing “hardlook” doctrine).
320
Id. at 412 (indicating that consideration of environmental costs and benefits is part of
Department of Transportation, rather than EPA, statute).
321
Id.
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the cost of compliance with the rulemaking.322 If challengers can successfully
categorize reduced revenues from fewer generation hours of operation of an
affected power generation facility as costs of complying with the regulation,
EPA’s rulemaking could be deemed by challengers as not benefit-positive or
as administratively unreasonable.
Citing the recent Supreme Court decision in King v. Burwell,323 decided in the same Court term, the challenging states on the cost issue in the
MATS regulation maintained that EPA would require explicit authority from
Congress to regulate an area in which it does not regularly participate (e.g.
electricity generation) or to implement aggressive measures to reorganize how
power is generated and sold in America, which is within FERC, not EPA,
jurisdiction. In King, the Court held that the IRS would not be granted Chevron
deference because the IRS does not have expertise in crafting health insurance
policies; Congress would have to grant express authority to the agency in order
to have this.324 When the costs of regulations are monetized, the benefits
typically must be too, as articulated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.325
The court concluded that the agency, NHTSA, “cannot put a thumb on the scale
by undervaluing the benefits and overvaluing the costs of more stringent
standards.”326
The next step is for the agency to exercise. To start, the Supreme Court
in Arlington v. FCC held that Chevron327 deference applies to an agency’s
interpretation of the scope of its own statutory jurisdiction: “statutory ambiguities will be resolved, within the bounds of reasonable interpretation, not by the
courts but by the administering agency.”328 There is no distinction in terms of
322

The Environmental Protection Agency must consider cost—including, most importantly, cost
of compliance—before deciding whether regulation of power plants under the Clean Air Act is
appropriate and necessary. Clean Air Act, § 112(n)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(n)(1)(A);
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2699.
323
See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (providing case that the challenging states cited).
324
Id. at 2488. “When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, we often apply the twostep framework announced in Chevron. Under that framework, we ask whether the statute is
ambiguous and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. This approach is ‘premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the
agency to fill in the statutory gaps.’ In extraordinary cases, however, there may be a reason to
hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.” Id.
325
See Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008) (indicating that one cannot count lopsided costs or benefits and
not the other when setting monetized environmental standards under the Clean Air Act
regarding greenhouse gas emissions).
326
Id.
327
See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing test for deference to administrative actions).
328
City of Arlington, Texas v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) (citing AT&T Corp. v.
Iowa Util. Bldg., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999)).
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deference afforded the agency between an agency’s “jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional” interpretations:329 “[i]f ‘the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute,’ that is the end of the matter.”330
A different presidential administration, by executive action without
congressional approval, can change either or both the OMB cost-benefit regulations and/or the substantive EPA Clean Air Act regulations. Executive Order
13771 of the Trump Administration directs that no agency may issue a new
rule unless the agency offsets the costs of the new rule by rescinding at least
two existing ones.331 The court found that environmental organizations could
not demonstrate standing or injury to challenge this as an unconstitutional
regulation violating the Administrative Procedure Act, in 2018.332
The executive branch began a process in 2017 to re-evaluate the
“benefit” attributed to saving a life or saving emission of CO2 from coal-fired
and other facilities.333 At EPA, in mid-2018, the agency released an Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to re-examine all cost and benefit analysis
by the agency.334 The notice notes both the recent Michigan335 and the Riverkeeper336 Supreme Court opinions, which require or permit, respectively,
329

Id. No “exception exists to the normal [deferential] standard of review” for “jurisdictional or
legal question[s] concerning the coverage” of an Act. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S.
822, 830 n.7 (1984). There is no principled basis for carving out an arbitrary subset of
“jurisdictional” questions from the Chevron framework. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm.
Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 333, 339 (2002) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44).
330
Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874-75 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). The Supreme Court
has afforded Chevron deference to agencies’ constructions of the scope of their own
jurisdiction. See generally, Commodity Futures Trading Co. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986);
United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305 (2009).
331
See Presidential Executive Order on Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,
WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/30/presidential-executive-order-reducing-regulation-and-controlling (Providing White House Executive
Order on regulation). See also, Public Citizen, Inc., et al., v. Donald Trump, Civil Action No. 17253 (Rdm) (D.C., 2017) (Case in which Executive Order was challenged).
332
Challenge to Trump’s 2-for-1 Deregulatory Order Rejected, Bloomberg Environment,
Feb. 26, 2018, https://bnanews.bna.com/environment-and-energy/challenge-to-trumps-2for-1-deregulatory-order-rejected.
333
See Gabriel Nelson, EPA Plans to Revisit a Touchy Topic – the Value of Saved Lifes,
GREENWIRE (Jan.18, 2011), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1059944118 (providing evidence that EPA will re-evaluate the benefit of saving lives).
334
Increasing Consistency and Transparency in Considering Costs and Benefits in the Rulemaking Process, ENV’TL PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-06
/documents/cost_and_benefit_consideration_anprm_pre-pub.pdf?utm_source=Federal+State+Po
licy+Updates+June+2018&utm_campaign=State+and+Federal+Updates&utm_medium=email.
335
Michigan, 135 S.Ct. at 2705.
336
Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. at 208.
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agency consideration of costs.337 The EPA notice includes that a comment
submitted to the Agency “has justified the stringency of a standard based on the
estimated benefits from reductions in pollutants not directly regulated by the
action (i.e., ‘ancillary benefits’ or ‘co-benefits’).”338 Things are now again in
motion. Coming full circle, fifteen states—Michigan, Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming–sued EPA in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 2016, for re-affirming its MATS
rule.339 Law has now changed so that EPA must consider cost before issuing
certain Clean Air Act regulations.340 However, the algorithm and inputs to the
cost calculation were not yet before the Court because EPA had not presented a
new cost algorithm for the Court to examine.341 Thus, this established a new
legal requirement, with no details yet on the algorithm for this now legally
required undertaking. The mechanism going forward is the next major matter of
first impression for the Court. Notwithstanding, Michigan v. EPA342 changed the
constitutional separation of powers, as well as mandating a quantitative process
as part of making law through certain regulation.

337

Id.
See Increasing Consistency supra note 334, at 6.
339
See Petition for Review, Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette v. U.S. Env’tl Prot.
Agency, No. 16-1204 (June 24, 2016 D.C. Cir.), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/
desktop/document/Michigan_Attorney_General_Bill_Schuette_v_US_Environmental_Prot
ec?1469159801 (lawsuit brought by states against EPA for reaffirming MATS rule).
340
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711.
341
Id.
342
Id.
338

